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 Prior research recognizes that there is a positive relation between financial 
reporting quality and investment efficiency. The primary object of this dissertation is to 
examine how financial reporting quality in multiple consecutive years impacts investment 
efficiency. I use material weaknesses in internal control (MW) as a proxy for poor 
financial reporting quality and I examine the impact of poor financial reporting quality in 
multiple consecutive years using an OLS regression model. The results indicate there is a 
progressively negative impact on investment efficiency tied to the number of consecutive 
years in which firms report MW. Additionally, I examine whether investment specific 
financial reporting quality issues have a greater impact on investment efficiency than all 
other types of financial reporting quality issues. My results suggest that investment 
specific financial reporting quality issues are driving the negative impact on investment 
efficiency. These results imply that managers can reduce investment inefficiency by 
focusing their resources on remediating (correcting) financial reporting quality issues 
(MW) associated with investment.  
Current internal control research identifies firms as having either strong or weak 
internal control dependent upon (1) the presence or absence of MW or (2) the number of 
MW. This research essentially treats each MW as being of equal importance, Thus, as a 
secondary objective of this dissertation, in Appendix B, I develop a metric for internal 
control using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to provide a weighting scheme for 
the different types of MW. Based on Audit Analytics (which separates MW into 21 
different categories), I engage 18 participants in an AHP exercise to determine which 
types of MW have the greatest impact on the financial statements. The results indicate 
that auditors and managers find MW related to Personnel Weaknesses have the greatest 
impact on the financial statements. AHP results in weights that are then applied to the 21 
different categories of MW. These weights are applied to firms based upon the types of 
MW reported and the sum of the weights is the measure used for the internal control 
metric. I then perform a simple OLS regression to test the relation between the internal 
control metric and stock market returns (Appendix C). I find that a positive relation exists 
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With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, a renewed interest in 
internal control has been signaled through an influx of academic research focused on 
internal control. This influx in research has been spurred by the SOX requirement that 
firms report on the status of their internal control systems within both their quarterly 
(Section 302) and their annual (Section 404) reports. If a firm finds any material 
weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (hereafter, MW), the firm must 
specifically report those MW within their quarterly and annual reports. This new firm 
specific internal control information has been used to examine a variety of issues that 
range from investigating the types of characteristics that are associated with firms that 
report MW (Ge and McVay 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007a) to 
investigating the relation between internal control systems and firm performance 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Gordon and Wilford 2012). This information is also 
helping to lead the way for a stream of research that examines the relation between 
financial reporting quality and a variety of management, stockholder, and creditor 
decisions.  
Research that uses the information provided as a result of SOX is paving the way 
for future advances in understanding and improving internal control systems. Although 
the SOX legislation uses a restricted definition of internal control, internal control over 
financial reporting, information available through SOX is providing researchers with the 
opportunity to more comprehensively examine firm-specific internal control issues. The 
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information gained from this limited view of internal control may one day be used to 
examine internal control in a more comprehensive format.  
One recent research trend in internal control examines the link between financial 
reporting quality (hereafter, FRQ) and investment efficiency. Lambert et al. (2007) 
present, theoretically, the effects of accounting information quality upon real investment 
decisions and Biddle et al. (2009) further examine this issue empirically using accounting 
information quality metrics. They find that higher FRQ leads to an increase in investment 
efficiency. Borrowing from the empirical techniques employed by Biddle et al. (2009), 
Cheng et al. (2011) examine the relation between MW, as a proxy for FRQ, and 
investment inefficiency and find that there is a negative and significant relation between 
investment inefficiency and reported MW.  
The primary objective of this dissertation is to re-examine and substantially 
extend the FRQ (as proxied by MW)-investment efficiency relation. I use MW as a proxy 
for FRQ, following prior research (Cheng et al. 2011; Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman 
2011). Additionally, I use the consecutive year MW framework established by Gordon 
and Wilford (2012) to analyze this relation and the results indicate that firms that 
consecutively report MW have a progressively negative and significant impact to their 
investment efficiency. Furthermore, I find that the negative impact on investment 
efficiency is perpetuated as firms report MW, but this negative impact can be alleviated 
through remediation. Also, I extend this prior research by examining how the MW-
investment efficiency relation is affected by capital investment-specific MW compared to 
MW in general. The results indicate that capital investment-specific MW drive 
investment inefficiency.  
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Current empirical internal control research describes the strength of firms internal 
control systems either dichotomously, as either strong or weak dependent upon whether 
the firm reports any internal control weaknesses or dependent on the number of MW 
reported (Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Gordon and Wilford 2012). 
As secondary objective of this dissertation, I develop an alternative continuous metric of 
internal control strength using an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) analysis, within 
Appendix B. This continuous internal control metric is developed using the opinions of 
three different financial statement stakeholder groups, (1) auditors, (2) financial analysts, 
and (3) managers. To develop the metric, participants are asked to compare the different 
types of reported MW using pairwise comparisons. Additionally, I test this metric 
empirically (Appendix C) to examine whether the metric is significantly related to firm 
performance. The results from this preliminary examination are significantly positive. For 
purposes of this dissertation, the AHP analysis, including the strengths and weaknesses of 
this analysis, are confined to Appendices B and C. 
1.2 Dissertation Outline 
 The primary objective of this dissertation is discussed in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
Chapter 2, entitled “Background and Literature Review of Internal Control,” examines 
the historical context of internal control and provides an overview of the SOX-related 
internal control literature. Only research that is particularly related to SOX and internal 
control is reviewed. Chapter 3, entitled, “Investment Efficiency and Financial Reporting 
Quality: Introduction,” includes the introduction and the literature review for the 
dissertation’s primary objective. Chapter 4, entitled, “Investment Efficiency and 
Financial Reporting Quality: Research Design,” includes the hypothesis development and 
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methodology development for the dissertation’s primary objective. Chapter 5, entitled, 
“Investment Efficiency and Financial Reporting Quality: Empirical Results,” includes the 
analyses and conclusions for this dissertation’s primary objective, the relation between 
FRQ and investment efficiency. Chapter 6 provides a brief summary of this dissertation’s 
findings and conclusions.  
The secondary objective of the dissertation is discussed in Appendix B, entitled 
“AHP Applied to Internal Control.” I develop a metric of internal control strength based 
on the types of MW that are reported by firms. I test this metric in Appendix C, entitled 
“AHP Internal Control Metric and Firm Performance.” 
!
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 Internal control plays a significant role on the operation of the firm and this role 
has been recognized by the attention this system has received from regulators, auditors 
and practitioners. In this chapter, I seek to provide a brief overview of the history of 
internal control domestically and internationally. Also, since SOX has been the instigator 
of a new wave of internal control research, I provide a non-comprehensive overview of 
the accounting research that has resulted in the post-SOX environment.  
2.2 History of Internal Control Requirements in the U.S. 
 
The definition of internal control has evolved significantly over the past century. 
Starting with a special report issued by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), entitled Internal Control, in 1949, a special committee defined 
internal control as:  
“. . . the plan of enterprise and all of the coordinate methods and measures 
adopted with a business to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy and reliability 
of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence 
to prescribed managerial policies.” (AICPA 1949, 6) 
 
This definition caused confusion among auditors during the 1960s due to the auditing 
requirement that: 
“There is to be proper study and evaluation of the existing internal control as a 
basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant extent of tests 
to which auditing procedures are to be restricted.” (AICPA 1963, 27) 
 
With the evaluation of this internal controls requirement in mind, auditors felt that to 
adequately test all controls related to operational efficiency and managerial policies 
would fall outside their expertise. As such, in 1963 the AICPA released Statement on 
!
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Auditing Procedure (SAP) No. 33 to provide further clarification to their definition of 
internal control and the duties of the auditor by distinguishing between two types of 
control: accounting control and administrative control. 
“In the broad sense, internal control includes, therefore, controls which may be 
characterized as either accounting or administrative, as follows: 
 
a. Accounting controls comprise the plan of organization and all methods and 
procedures that are concerned mainly with, and relate directly to, 
safeguarding of assets and the reliability of the financial records. They 
generally include such controls as the systems of authorization and approval, 
separation of duties concerned with record keeping and accounting reports 
from those concerned with operations or asset custody, physical controls over 
assets, and internal auditing. 
 
b. Administrative controls comprise the plan of organization and all methods 
and procedures that are concerned mainly with operational efficiency and 
adherence to managerial policies and usually relate only indirectly to the 
financial records. They generally include such controls as statistical analyses, 
time and motion studies, performance reports, employee training programs, 
and quality controls.” (AICPA 1963, 28) 
 
After creating a clear division between these two types of controls, the SAP explained 
that the auditor should be primarily concerned with accounting controls, since the 
auditor’s goal is to attest to the reliability of financial data. Although distinguishing 
between accounting and administrative controls was meant to provide clarification, many 
accountants believed it provided more confusion (Bower and Schlosser 1965). 
In 1977 in connection with the Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted additional requirements that firms 
should establish and maintain a system of internal accounting controls and keep detailed 
records of this system. Even with the passage of the FCPA, firms continued to struggle 
with the definition of strong internal control. Then, in 1978, the Cohen Commission 
recommended that firms include within their financial statements a statement of negative 
!
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assurance regarding internal control.1 The SEC considered this recommendation and 
subsequently issued a ruling calling for mandatory management reports on a firm’s 
internal accounting control system. Since the AICPA was the responsible party in 
releasing audit standards during this time period, they were criticized for not providing 
adequate internal control guidance and answered this criticism by issuing Statement on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 30, Reporting on Internal Accounting Control. This SAS 
provided guidance specifically related to terminology in the management report. 
Subsequently, SAS No. 55, Consideration of the Internal Control Structure in a 
Financial Statement Audit, was released in 1990. SAS No. 55 was more comprehensive 
and defined internal control in relation to three areas: (1) the control environment, (2) the 
accounting system, and (3) control procedures. SAS No. 55 was a move toward a broader 
definition of internal control.  
The high inflation and interest rates of the late 1970s and 1980s coincided with 
the failure of many U.S. firms. Congress associated the failures with business and audit 
deficiencies and formed the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting to 
fulfill the role of examining these issues more closely. This commission later became 
known as the Treadway Commission and was composed of the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA), the AICPA, Financial Executives International (FEI), the American 
Accounting Association (AAA) and the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA). 
From the Treadway Commission, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) 
was formed and this organization has focused on providing internal control guidance to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"!Negative assurance informs users that no information came to the attention of the auditor that would 
suggest that a company is not in compliance with the requirements that are being attested to in the 
engagement. 
!
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firms. The COSO Internal Control-Integrated Framework was released in 1992 and this 
guidance provides a multidimensional description of internal control: 
“Internal control is a process affected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: 
 
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations2 
• Reliability of financial reporting 
• Compliance with laws and regulations (COSO 1992). 
 
After the scandals at the turn of the century (Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, etc.), 
Congress intervened, once again, and passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on 
July 30, 2002.  Among the sections included within the regulation, two sections, Sections 
302 and 404, focus on internal control reporting and are specifically targeted towards 
companies that are required to file their financial statements with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). A timeline illustrating the effective dates for Sections 302 
and 404 is illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
Section 302 became effective 30 days after the passage of SOX and requires the 
chief executive officer and the chief financial officer to certify each quarterly and annual 
report.  These certifications must contain statements by the officers of the firm that they 
are responsible for the internal control within the organization, they have evaluated the 
effectiveness of the internal control systems, and they have disclosed any MW. 
Additionally, the officers must disclose any significant deficiencies in internal control to 
the audit committee, board, and company auditors (U.S. House of Representatives 2002).    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Operations management can be defined as “the design, operation, and improvement of the systems that 
create and deliver the firm’s primary products and services” (Jacobs et al. 2009). The first component of 
internal control is most closely related to managerial accounting, whereas, the second component of 
internal control is most closely related to financial accounting. 
!
! ! !9 
Section 404 of SOX contains two reporting requirements. The first requirement is 
laid out in Section 404(a) and it stipulates that annual reports must contain a report from 
the company’s management that assesses the effectiveness of the company’s internal 
control over financial reporting. This requirement became effective at different stages 
depending on filing status.3 Companies that are categorized as U.S. accelerated filers 
have been required to comply with Section 404(a) for all fiscal years ending on or after 
November 15, 2004. Companies categorized as non-accelerated filers have been required 
to comply with Section 404(a) for all fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2007. 
The second requirement is laid out in Section 404(b) and requires the auditors of filers to 
attest to management’s assessment of internal control effectiveness.4  Accelerated filers 
are required to comply with Section 404(b) for all fiscal years ending on or after 
November 15, 2004.  However, non-accelerated filers have been exempted from the 
auditor assessment requirement through the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.   
While SOX laid out the internal control responsibilities of top executives and 
management, the legislation failed to provide a definition of internal control. After 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Filers with the SEC can be categorized as either accelerated or non-accelerated filers. An accelerated filer 
is defined by the SEC as: “(1) the issuer had an aggregate market value of voting and non- voting common 
equity held by non-affiliates of the issuer of $75 million or more, as of the last business day of the issuer’s 
most recently completed second fiscal quarter; (2) the issuer had been subject to the reporting requirements 
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)] for a period of at least 12 
calendar months; (3) the issuer previously had filed at least one annual report; and (4) the issuer was not 
eligible to use Forms 10-KSB and 10-QSB [17 CFR 249.310b and 17 CFR 249.308b] for its annual and 
quarterly reports” (SEC 2005).!
4 Since the passage of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5), “An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements,” by the PCAOB, there has been some 
confusion as to the impact of reported MW on the auditor’s financial statement opinion. Although the 
audits (the internal control audit and the financial statement audit) are performed in concert with one 
another, the opinions generated are separate. Just because a firm may report MW and subsequently extends 
a qualified internal control opinion, does not mean that the firm is then required to extend a qualified 
financial statement opinion. However, the presence of MW does signal to the auditor that the controls in 
question cannot be relied upon and as a result, they must perform additional tests to ensure the financial 
statements fairly present a firm’s financial position.  
!
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Congress passed SOX, the SEC, as the regulatory reporting agency for publicly listed 
firms, was given enforcement responsibility over publicly listed firms. Within an earlier 
section of COSO’s internal control guidance, COSO clearly states that “[p]roblems are 
compounded when the term [internal control], if not clearly defined, is written into law, 
regulation or rule” (COSO 1992). These problems were evident as accountants, once 
again, started questioning the broadness of the definition of internal control as it applied 
to SOX. As a result, the SEC released a report in 2003 stating that for reporting purposes 
auditors were only required to provide assurance related to internal controls over 
financial reporting, the second of three key components within the COSO definition 
(SEC 2003). 5 
In addition to providing guidance on the definition of internal control, the SEC 
provided filers with definitions for different categories of internal control weaknesses. A 
significant deficiency is defined as: “A deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in 
internal control over financial reporting that is less severe than a material weakness, yet 
important enough to merit attention by those responsible for oversight of the registrant’s 
financial reporting” (SEC 2007a). Alternatively, a material weakness is defined as: “a 
deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting, 
such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company's 
annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis” 
(SEC 2007b). Although firms are only required to specifically report MW in their Section 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The definitions presented within this section are generally presented as those that are used by external 
auditors in carrying out their duties with respect to the financial statement audit. However, internal auditors 
are also heavily involved in the internal control process and use the entire internal control definition (IIA 
2008) that is proposed by COSO to carry out their duties (which include duties outside the realm of 
financial statements). 
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302 and 404 filings, management is required to communicate significant deficiencies to 
the audit committee, board, and external auditors.  
2.3 International Response to Internal Control  
Although the above discussion focuses upon the U.S. response to deficiencies in 
internal control, other countries have also significantly improved their internal control 
regulations. Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom are among the many 
countries that have been involved in the movement towards a more transparent internal 
control environment. 
Canada has followed a “watch and see” approach to implementing their internal 
control legislation. Similar to SOX, the Canadian legislation relates only to internal 
control over financial reporting and Canada has followed the U.S in utilizing the COSO 
definition of internal control and the COSO framework for internal control.6 Bill 198 was 
passed in Ontario, Canada in October of 2002 as Canada’s SOX equivalent (Ecker 2002). 
The largest stock exchange in Canada, TSX, is located in Toronto and thus, this 
legislation applies to most Canadian public companies. Full compliance with Bill 198 
was not required until 2008 and the legislation includes guidelines and timetables that 
companies can follow in attaining complete compliance. Bill 198 requires that firms 
review and document their internal controls. Similar to SOX Section 302, Canada also 
passed MI 52-109, which requires executives to provide an internal control certification 
within both their quarterly and annual reports. Bill 198 documentation should support the 
executive certifications that are required through MI 52-109 (MI 2005).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 However, Canada leaves the framework up to the firm’s discretion and the Turnbull Guidance (U.K) and 
CoCo (Canada) are also acceptable frameworks that can be used in establishing internal control systems. 
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Up until 2008, Canadian firms were not required to report on any MW beyond 
those that are reported in the executive certifications. However, MI 52-109 was amended 
in late 2008 and firms are now required to report MW in their MD&A. In contrast to 
SOX 404(b), Canada does not require external auditors to attest to management’s 
assessment of internal control. The Canadian internal control requirements were 
combined into one piece of legislation in October 2008 as NI 52-109 (NI 2008).  
France passed the Financial Security Act (LSF) on August 1, 2003, as their form 
of internal control regulation (LSF 2003). LSF has many financial reporting and internal 
control provisions that are similar to SOX. However, unlike SOX, LSF uses a broader 
definition of internal control that includes not only internal control over financial 
reporting, but it also requires that firms document all of their business processes. In 
addition to LSF applying to public companies, any firm that has a board of directors, or a 
management board, or is involved in an IPO needs to comply with the regulations. Rather 
than management submitting documentation on internal controls, it is the board chairman 
that is responsible for reporting on the internal controls of the firm. The reports by the 
board chairman are similar to those that are defined within SOX 404. Additionally, 
auditors are required to submit a report on their audit of the board’s assessment of 
internal control, similar to SOX 404(b). 
Japan passed the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (FIE), in June of 2006, 
as their form of explicit internal control regulation. The FIE closely mirrors SOX along a 
set of different dimensions that include: definitions, reporting requirements, framework 
and method of reporting deficiencies. Similar to SOX, the FIE relates only to internal 
control over financial reporting and Japan has followed the U.S in utilizing the COSO 
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definition of internal control. All public companies are required to comply with FIE if 
they are listed on the Japanese exchanges and two reports must be included within public 
filings, a management report and an auditor’s report. FIE designates that the five 
components of the COSO framework should be used as guidance in defining and 
establishing internal control systems.7 FIE also defines MW as the most severe form of 
internal control deficiency and requires that all MW be reported in both the management 
report and the auditor’s report. 
While the above FIE requirements have significant ties to SOX, differences do 
exist. As noted in the previous section, SOX requires only accelerated filers to file both a 
management report and an auditor’s report. However, the FIE requires all firms, 
regardless of size, to file both reports. Additionally, within these reports, firms are 
required to include a specific response on the steps the firm is taking to establish strong 
controls over their information technology. Although other countries have stated the 
importance of information technology within their internal control guidance, specific 
information technology reporting requirements are found only within FIE. One of the 
many SOX complaints that has been cited by firms is that specific guidance on how to 
comply is not available. The FIE has provided specific implementation guidance to aid 
firms in establishing strong internal control systems. 
The internal control regulations discussed above are rules-based. The U.K. has 
taken a different approach and has internal control regulations that are primarily 
principles-based. The U.K. passed their internal control legislation in 2006. Firms are 
prompted to develop and maintain strong internal control systems, with a definition of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#!The five components of the COSO framework are (1) control environment, (2) risk assessment, (3) 
control activities, (4) information and communication, and (5) monitoring. The U.S. also suggests that this 
guidance be used for companies that are working towards SOX compliance. 
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internal control that includes (1) control over financial reporting, (2) controls related to 
the efficiency and effectiveness of operations, (3) controls governing compliance with 
laws and regulations, and (4) risk management. The firm internal control reporting 
process also differs within the U.K.  Firms are required to have an overall internal control 
assessment that is completed by the board rather than management and auditor 
assessments.  Additionally, firms follow a “comply or explain” approach. Under the 
“comply or explain” approach, a firm is required to explain, if they did not comply, any 
and all reasons why internal control compliance was not achieved. Firms in the U.K. 
follow the Turnbull Guidance for Internal Control to achieve compliance with 
regulations. The Turnbull Guidance is also used as a framework to develop internal 
control systems. This guidance is based upon COSO and includes the five COSO 
components. Severe deficiencies in internal control are referred to as significant failures 
and should always be reported in addition to MW. 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the different types of internal control legislation 
that are discussed above. 
2.4 Internal Control Literature Related to SOX 
 
 Internal control has been a predominant topic in the accounting literature for 
decades (e.g., see Bower and Schlosser, 1965; Yu and Neter, 1973; Cushing, 1974). 
Although firms were required to maintain adequate systems of internal control prior to 
SOX, the disclosure of internal control was limited to situations (i.e., a change in auditor) 
that required the filing of an 8-K form (SEC 1988). The absence of firm specific internal 
control information inhibited internal control research that could examine the impact of 
poor internal control on firm specific factors. Since the passage of SOX, the internal 
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control information provided through quarterly and annual financial reports has been 
used to more fully examine the economic impact of poor internal control.  
2.4.1 Determinants of Internal Control Weaknesses 
 The first studies to utilize firm specific internal control information examined the 
determinants of weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. Prior to SOX, Ge 
and McVay (2005) found that companies that report MW are smaller, more complex and 
less profitable than firms that do not report MW. Doyle et al. (2007a) confirm Ge and 
McVay (2005) and also find that younger firms and firms that have recently exhibited 
signs of rapid growth and restructuring are more likely to report MW. Also, these results 
are more prominent in firms that report entity-level MW, as opposed to account-specific 
MW (Doyle et al. 2007a). In addition to confirming the prior determinant results, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) find that firms with fewer resources to devote to internal 
control, and firms that “face greater control risk . . . and have greater reporting 
incentives” (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) are more likely to report MW.  
2.4.2 Financial Reporting Quality and Internal Control  
Recent research also documents that firms that report MW also have lower 
earnings quality, proxied by accruals, compared to firms that do not report MW 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Doyle et al. 2007b). Chan et al. (2008) note evidence of a 
positive relation between reported MW and earnings management. Since earnings 
management and accrual quality have a direct effect on FRQ, one noted benefit of SOX 
compliance is increased FRQ. Nagy (2010) find that compliance with and strong internal 
control reporting under Section 404 of SOX is leading to the improvement in the quality 
of financial reports. Feng et al. (2009) find evidence to support the conjecture that 
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managers within firms that report MW are more likely to be relying on inaccurate data 
when forming and making management guidance disclosure decisions. Goh and Li 
(2011) find a positive relation between conservatism and internal control quality, as 
proxied by the presence or absence of MW. Additionally, some researchers are using the 
presence or absence of MW as a proxy for FRQ (Cheng et al. 2011; Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman 2011). Chapter 3 develops this research and uses MW as a proxy 
for FRQ. 
2.4.3 Firm Performance and Internal Control   
 One of the more popular recent streams in the internal control literature examines 
the association between internal control and firm performance. Hammersley et al. (2008) 
and Kim and Park (2009) find a negative stock price reaction is related to disclosing MW 
under Section 302 of SOX. Similarly, Beneish et al. (2008) find that reporting Section 
302 MW results in negative abnormal returns. On the other hand, Section 404 MW do not 
significantly impact stock prices (Beneish et al. 2008). Additionally, Beneish et al. (2008) 
find that accelerated filers have significantly lower negative stock market returns than 
non-accelerated filers.  
 In addition to stock market returns, researchers have also examined if there is an 
impact on cost of capital for firms that report MW. This research builds upon the work of 
Lambert et al. (2007) that theoretically argues internal control weaknesses impact the 
quality of a firm’s accounting information disclosures and subsequently increase firms’ 
cost of equity. Ogneva et al. (2007) do not find evidence that a higher cost of equity is 
associated with reporting SOX Section 404 MW, after controlling for firm characteristics 
and predicted analyst forecast error. Consistent with these results, Beneish et al. (2008) 
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also find no significant relation between SOX Section 404 MW and a higher cost of 
equity. However, Beneish et al. (2008) do find a higher cost of equity is associated with 
the disclosure of SOX Section 302 MW.  
 In contrast to the research noted above, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) find a 
significant increase in cost of equity among firms that report Section 404 MW and firms 
that report Section 302 MW but subsequently file clean Section 404 reports. Additionally, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) find that MW remediation improves (lowers) the cost of 
equity. Gordon and Wilford (2012) provide strong evidence, based on analyses of 
consecutive MW over a six-year period, that an increase in cost of equity is associated 
with reporting MW and the negative impact on firm cost of equity from reporting MW in 
one year is substantially lower than reporting MW in two, three, and four consecutive 
years. Gordon and Wilford (2012) reconcile the mixed results in the prior research and 
they find that it is the remediation of MW that leads to a decrease in the cost of equity for 
firms that report MW. 
 Although empirical research related to equity funding has been the focus of 
research, new databases are now providing the opportunity to examine the impacts of 
different factors on debt funding. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) examine whether SOX provides 
new information to the public debt market, resulting in changes to the cost of debt. They 
find that an increased cost of debt is more pronounced with firms that report MW and are 
monitored by credit rating agencies and/or banks. In line with the results obtained by 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Kim et al. (2011) find that firms that report MW experience 
greater direct and indirect debt costs than firms that do not report MW. Also, this study 
notes that banks charge higher interest rates to firms that report MW (Kim et al. 2011).  
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2.4.4 Audit Fees and Internal Control 
 Because of the significant role played by auditors in determining the effectiveness 
of accelerated filers’ internal control systems, the changes in internal control regulation 
have had a significant impact on audit fees. Research notes that increased audit fees are 
associated with firms that report Section 404 MW (Raghunandan and Rama 2006; 
Hoitash et al. 2008). Additionally, Hoitash et al. (2008) find that audit fees are also 
higher in firms that report MW compared to firms that report significant deficiencies. 
Ettredge et al. (2007) find that firms that pay higher audit fees in the post-SOX 
environment are more likely to dismiss their auditors and dismissals are more likely in 
firms that report MW. Hogan and Wilkins (2008) show that firms that report more severe 
MW will experience higher fee increments and have higher levels of inherent risk and 
information risk. Also, research indicates that the relation between audit fees and 
financial reporting risk increased dramatically in 2002 in response to the increased 
business and litigation risk resulting from SOX (Charles et al. 2010).  
 In response to critics denouncing the high costs associated with SOX, Munsif et al. 
(2011) and Hoag and Hollingsworth (2011) use four consecutive years of data to examine 
how audit fees are affected by the remediation (correction) of MW and find that firms 
that remediate their MW have lower audit fees compared to firms that do not remediate 
their MW. Also, audit fee premiums continue to be paid up to two years following 
remediation by firms that have reported MW compared to firms that have not previously 
reported MW (Munsif et al. 2011; Hoag and Hollingsworth 2011). Kinney and 
Shepardson (2011) use a natural experimental to assess the change in audit fees for non-
accelerated filers versus accelerated filers in a post-SOX era and find that management 
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internal control reports and financial statement audits are a cost-effective way of 
enforcing SOX for small firms. 
2.4.5 The Auditor/Firm Relationship and Internal Control 
 Auditor dismissal research suggests that subsequent auditors give audit fee 
discounts to clients. However, Huang et al. (2009) find that initial clients of Big 4 
auditors enjoy an audit fee premium in the post-SOX environment. Ettredge et al. (2011) 
attempt to identify the determinants of auditor dismissal in the post-SOX environment 
using a sample of four consecutive years and find that the presence of MW is the most 
significant factor associated with auditor dismissals. Landsman et al. (2009) examine 
whether there is a change in the sensitivity of auditor changes to client risk and 
misalignment after SOX and find that there is not a difference in the sensitivity of auditor 
switches to client risk. They do find that changes in auditors in the post-SOX 
environment are a function of the need to rebalance client portfolios in response to 
capacity constraints that are a result of the increase in client requirements.  
2.4.6  The Audit Committee and Internal Control   
 In addition to the new internal control requirements, SOX imposes additional 
restrictions regarding the audit committee. In the post-SOX environment audit 
committees are required to be one hundred percent independent and one of the members 
of the committee is required to be classified as a financial expert (inclusive of both 
accounting and non-accounting financial experts). Defond et al. (2005) and Hoitash et al. 
(2009) find that a positive market reaction is significantly associated with the 
appointment of accounting financial experts to the audit committee, but no market 
reaction appears to be associated with the appointment of non-accounting financial 
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experts. There is also evidence that the presence of accounting financial experts on the 
audit committee impacts the effectiveness of internal control. Naiker and Sharma (2009) 
identify that there is a negative association between the presence of former audit partners 
on the audit committee and the presence of MW. Krishnan et al. (2011) find that more 
socially connected directors are chosen in the post-SOX time period. Additionally, there 
is a positive relation between the ties connecting boards and upper management and 
earnings quality (Krishnan et al. 2011). 
 Similarly, using pre-SOX internal control data obtained through 8-K reports, 
Krishnan (2005) finds that audit committees that are independent and have a financial 
expert are less likely to report MW. Recognizing the importance of the audit committee 
in the quality of financial reporting post-SOX, Beasley et al. (2009) interview members 
of various audit committees and find responses to internal control questions tend to vary 
dependent upon member appointment date (pre- or post-SOX), confirming the 
differences in the experience of individuals that are appointed post-SOX (i.e., individuals 
with more internal control experience are appointed post-SOX).  Finally, Engel et al. 
(2010) find that audit committee compensation is positively associated with the demand 
for monitoring (as measured by audit fees and SOX impact). 
2.4.7 Economic Consequences of SOX 
 Internal control research in the post-SOX era has also examined the economic 
impact associated with SOX. Zhang (2007) finds that firms that are impacted by SOX 
experience negative cumulative abnormal returns around the legislative events occurring 
before and after the passage of SOX. The impact of SOX on listing decisions appears to 
have been the most significant consequence of SOX. Leuz et al. (2007) find that the 
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increased cost of SEC disclosure brought about through the passage of SOX legislation 
has resulted in a significant increase in the number of firms that file for deregistration.  
Also, Engel et al. (2007) find a significant increase in the number of going private 
decisions following the passage of SOX and attribute this increase to SOX compliance 
costs. Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) examine the probability of foreign firms listing on 
the U.S. exchanges versus the U.K. stock exchanges. Their results indicate that large 
foreign firms continue to be drawn to the U.S. stock exchanges; however, small foreign 
firms are more likely to list on the U.K stock exchange in the post-SOX environment.   
 Another unintended consequence of SOX legislation is captured through a study 
that exploits the natural test environment that is available due to the permanently delayed 
compliance requirements for non-accelerated filers. Gao et al. (2009) find that non-
accelerated filers have incentives to remain small to avoid additional regulatory 
disclosure and do so by investing less, increasing dividend payouts and increasing 
negative disclosures.    
 Although a significant portion of the research on the SOX impact focuses upon 
the negative consequences associated with the legislation, there have also been positive 
consequences. Patterson and Smith (2007) employ a theoretical model to illustrate that 
SOX improves internal control within the audit function by reducing the incidence of 
fraud. Additionally, although audit costs increase in the short-run, in the steady-state, 
equilibrium audit costs are expected to decrease and audit efficiency is expected to 
increase (Patterson and Smith 2007).  
 Even though firms have reported significant costs related to expanded audits, 
Bedard and Graham (2011) use proprietary data obtained through audit firms and report 
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that auditors detect approximately three-fourths of reported MW. This result suggests that 
there is significant value that is attached to the Section 404(b) auditor assessment filing 
requirements. Additionally, Kinney and Shepardson (2011) find that first-time non-
accelerated 404(a) firms experience MW disclosure rates that are comparable to the first-
time MW disclosure rates for accelerated firms that are required to file reports in 
compliance with both Section 404(a) and 404(b). However, Kinney and Shepardson 
(2011) are not able to capitalize on the richness of the data used by Bedard and Graham 
(2011) and their results could be significantly affected by this difference. 
 Research focusing upon the economic consequences of SOX has also found that 
corporate risk-taking (Bargeron et al. 2010) and option backdating have declined 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2009) post-SOX.  Also, SOX appears to have reduced the opportunities 
for strategic accrual manipulation (Comprix and Muller 2011). Another unintended 
consequence of SOX is illustrated in a study by Gordon et al. (2006). They find evidence 
to suggest that information security activites receive more attention in the post-SOX 
environment (Gordon et al. 2006). 
2.4.8  The Relation Between Corporate Governance and MW under SOX  
 Audit committee characteristics and board quality characteristics have been used 
as proxies for corporate governance. Research indicates that firms are less likely to report 
Section 404 MW when they have a higher level of corporate governance quality (Hoitash 
et al. 2009). Also, the types of MW that are reported vary depending on the experiences 
of the members of the audit committee and the board of directors (Hoitash et al. 2009). 
Auditors have anecdotally recognized the changes in corporate governance that are 
reported in the empirical research. According to interviews with external auditors, there 
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have been significant and positive changes in corporate governance (i.e. board of 
directors, audit committee, control environment, etc.) in the post-SOX environment 
(Cohen et al. 2010). When MW are present, Goh (2009) finds that a significant and 
positive association exists between firms with larger audit committees, audit committees 
with greater non-accounting financial expertise, and more independent boards and timely 
remediation of those MW.  
 Another aspect of corporate governance relates to the qualifications of financial 
executives.  Li et al. (2010) find evidence that firms with MW are more likely to have a 
chief financial executive with less experience. Wang (2010) and Johnstone et al. (2011) 
find that chief financial officers of companies with poor internal control receive lower 
compensation and their turnover rates are higher. Furthermore, remediation of MW is 
positively associated with an increase in the turnover of audit committee members and an 
increase in the proportion of independent board members (Johnstone et al. 2011). 
2.4.9 Information Technology and Internal Control 
  Research that focuses on the impact of SOX and on the information technology 
environment has been gaining traction in the current literature. COSO specifically 
identifies information technology as a vehicle that should be used to enhance and 
strengthen the control environment. Masli et al. (2010) document that internal control 
monitoring technology is associated with a lower likelihood of reported MW, smaller 
audit fee increases, and smaller audit delay increases. Klamm and Watson (2009) find 
evidence that firms that report information technology MW report a greater number of 
MW than firms that do not report IT-related MW.  This research indicates that IT MW 
have a pervasive and negative impact on the firm.  
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  Wallace et al. (2011) implement an exploratory research design to identify the 
most and least commonly implemented IT controls and find that differences between 
firms exist based on firm size, industry and status (public vs. private).  Enterprise 
Resource Planning systems are able to take advantage of the new focus on internal 
controls because of the “built-in” controls feature.  An investigation of firms with ERP 
systems compared to firms without ERP systems finds that firms with ERP systems are 
less likely to report MW (Morris 2011).  
  Arnold et al. (2007) find that there is a substantial need for research on emerging 
technologies that will help to alleviate the challenges faced by smaller firms in complying 
with Section 404 requirements. Trompeter and Wright (2010) provide results to a study 
that suggests technological advances and audit approaches have facilitated a change in 
analytical procedural practices. Additionally, SOX and financial scandals have driven the 
change in analytical procedure practices (Trompeter and Wright 2010).  
2.4.10 Shareholders and Internal Control 
  One stakeholder group being examined more closely within the internal control 
environment is the shareholder group. Using a sample of firms that report Section 404 
MW, Hermanson et al. (2009) find that shareholders perception of the audit internal 
control opinion is tied to the presence of restatements and the categories of MW reported.  
They find that shareholders appreciate auditors that report company-level MW with no 
restatements. However, if an auditor reports non-company-level MW with a restatement, 
shareholders hold the auditor partly responsible (Hermanson et al. 2009). Further, 
Hochberg et al. (2009) find evidence that shareholders lobbied in favor of the strict 
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implementation of SOX that expanded the definition to include the efficiency and 
effectiveness of operations.  
Cassar and Garakos (2010) provide a first look at the hedge fund determinants of 
internal controls and fund fees. They find that internal controls are stronger in hedge 
funds with high agency costs located in areas with limited legal repercussions (Cassar 
and Garakos 2010). Also, they find manager profit is positively and significantly 
associated with strong internal control systems. MW also impact investor perceptions of 
investment risk (Rose et al. 2010). More specifically, Rose et al. (2010) find that 
investors adjust their assessments of investment risk based on MW pervasiveness and 
detail disclosure. DeFond et al. (2011) find a decline in bondholder value is associated 
with events tied to SOX.   
2.5 Summary 
Table 2.2 summarizes the key points from the literature that is reviewed above. 
The strength of an internal control system within the firm has been studied extensively as 
a result of the firm specific internal control information that is now available because of 
the SOX requirements. However, internal control is not a new topic and has been 
discussed extensively by various stakeholders for decades. Within this chapter, I provided 
a brief historical overview of the role of internal control and the regulations that are in 
force today, both domestically and internationally. Finally, I have provided a brief 
overview of the current literature that has resulted in consequence of the passage of SOX.  
This overview of the literature is in no way meant to be taken as a comprehensive 
account, but rather to provide a feel of where we have been and where we are going. As 
can be seen from the review above, MW have been examined extensively in the context 
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of how they apply to SOX. More recently, the MW have been used as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality. Future research could build off of the concept of using MW as 
a proxy to examine a variety of issues. I build on this stream of research and use MW as a 
proxy for financial reporting quality to examine the impact of financial reporting quality 
on investment efficiency in the chapters that follow.  
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The increased attention to internal control and the associated internal control 
disclosure requirements provide an opportunity to examine internal control in the context 
of financial reporting quality (hereafter, FRQ). Prior research recognizes that there is a 
significant relation between material weaknesses in internal control over financial 
reporting (hereafter, MW) and the quality of accounting information. Lambert et al. 
(2007) theoretically establish “that the quality of accounting information influences a 
firm’s cost of capital through its effect on a firm’s real decisions” (Lambert et al. 2007, 
388).  
Three direct links have been made to Lambert et al. (2007) with respect to MW. 
First, Doyle et al. (2007b) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) empirically examine the 
relation between MW and FRQ, using accruals quality as a proxy, and find that lower 
FRQ is significantly associated with MW disclosure. Second, Beneish et al. (2008), 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) and Gordon and Wilford (2012) document that firms that 
disclose MW have a higher cost of capital compared to firms that do not disclose MW. 
As a precursor to the third link, Feng et al. (2009) and Li et al. (2012) document a 
relation between MW disclosure and less accurate management forecasts. Less accurate 
management forecasts and inefficient real investment decisions are the result of poor 
FRQ. The third and final link, that has been briefly but not thoroughly explored, 
examines the effect of FRQ, upon a firm’s real investment decisions (Biddle and Hillary 
2006; Biddle et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2011).  
!
! ! !28 
Biddle and Hillary (2006) find that higher FRQ improves investment efficiency. 
Furthermore, Biddle et al. (2009) find that overinvestment and underinvestment are both 
reduced as FRQ increases. Chen et al. (2011) extend this research to private firms in 
emerging industries and confirm the prior results in the private industry context. The 
above noted research recognizes the relation between FRQ and real investment decisions. 
However, the effect of remediation, as a monitoring mechanism, and also the potentially 
detrimental effects of reporting MW in multiple years has not been examined.  
Furthermore, prior research has not considered whether the investment specific MW have 
a varying impact on investment decisions compared to the other types of MW. 
The primary objective of this study is to empirically examine the relation between 
FRQ, as proxied by MW, and real investment decisions. Recent research has used MW as 
a proxy for FRQ (Cheng et al. 2011; Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman 2011). More 
specifically, particular emphasis is given to examining the way FRQ issues (MW) in 
multiple consecutive years affect a firm’s real investment decisions, as well as the effect 
of the correction/remediation of FRQ issues on the FRQ-investment efficiency 
association. The current study also examines whether the investment decisions of firms 
that have reported FRQ issues (MW) associated with investment related accounts vary 
from firms that do not report issues in investment related accounts.  
The current study utilizes a dataset that contains a large sample of firms that 
report FRQ issues in two years, as well as firms that report FRQ issues in three, four, 
five, and six years. Thus, I differentiate between firms that report FRQ issues in only one 
year and firms reporting FRQ issues in two or more consecutive years. As such, this 
study examines whether the decrease in investment efficiency following disclosure is due 
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to remediation rather than disclosure (Cheng et al. 2011). Whereas Biddle et al. (2009), 
focus on the effects that FRQ has upon agency concerns (i.e. adverse selection and moral 
hazard), the current study focuses upon how correction/remediation of FRQ issues effects 
investment efficiency.  
The results of this study indicate that reporting FRQ issues (MW) in multiple 
consecutive years will have an increasingly significant and negative impact upon 
investment efficiency. Furthermore, it is the remediation of FRQ issues that results in an 
increase in investment efficiency rather than the disclosure of FRQ issues. Additionally, I 
find that even though firms report multiple types of FRQ issues, it is the investment 
specific FRQ issues that are driving the investment inefficiencies.    
3.2 Background on Investment 
3.2.1 Determinants of Investment 
An extensively large body of accounting, economics, and finance literature 
focuses on a broad range of topics related to investment. Early investment research 
focused on determinants of investment and two main theories were developed. Within the 
first theory, Meyer and Kuh (1957) stress that financing constraints are the main 
determinant contributing to business investment. Fazzari and Athey (1987) support the 
prior theoretical finding using interest and cash flow information within an empirical 
study. As a second theory, Modigliani and Miller (1958) find that certain conditions lead 
to the irrelevance of financial structure when making real investment decisions and focus 
on decisions that will maximize shareholder wealth. Elliott (1973) finds, within his 
extensive research, that an ideal model of investment is still an open question. Fazzari et 
al. (1988) agree with Elliott (1973) and note that additional theoretical and empirical 
!
! ! !30 
research is needed to examine the role that financial constraints play in the investment 
decision. In a recent capital-market investments review, Hubbard (1998) notes clarity on 
the investment decision is still not available and “more research is needed to isolate the 
sources of . . . imperfections that affect firm decisions” (Hubbard 1998, 222). 
Furthermore, Gordon et al. (2006) comment that “[management accounting systems], 
should play an important role in rectifying informational impediments to capital 
investments” (Gordon et al. 2006, 162). 
Although different investment models have appeared throughout the capital 
investment literature, Nair (1979) suggest that the accounting information used to make 
economic decisions can have an impact. The work by Nair (1979) alludes to the 
importance of FRQ in the investment decision. Much of the investments research in the 
accounting literature examines the relationship between investment expenditures and 
management decisions. Jackson (2008) finds evidence that suggests investment decisions 
are affected by the depreciation method employed. Additionally, Larcker (1983) and 
Waegelein (1988) examine the relation between capital investments and performance 
plan adoption. Biddle and Hilary (2006) find evidence that investment decisions at the 
firm-level are significantly effected by FRQ. More broadly, they suggest that FRQ may 
be used as a tool to mitigate investment inefficiency (Biddle and Hilary, 2006) and 
Biddle et al. (2009) find evidence that higher levels of FRQ do decrease both 
overinvestment and underinvestment.  
3.2.2 Internal Control and Capital Investments 
SOX contains Sections 302 and 404 that substantially increase firms’ 
responsibility for and disclosure of items related to internal control systems over financial 
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reporting. The increased disclosure of internal control activities has resulted in increased 
firm specific internal control data. This data has been used to examine the consequences 
associated with weak internal control systems and their subsequent disclosure. Initial 
studies have found that firms reporting MW are smaller, younger, financially weaker 
(Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007), and have a lower level of FRQ (Doyle 
et al. 2007b; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008), as proxied by accruals quality. Firms 
reporting MW also have higher costs of capital (Beneish et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. 2009; Gordon and Wilford 2012) and higher audit fees (Raghunandan and Rama 2006; 
Hoitash et al. 2008). 
One of the overarching themes that appears within the above research is that 
disclosure of MW is a signal to the market of poor FRQ. Lambert et al. (2007) capture 
this argument in their theoretical work that establishes a connection between FRQ and its 
effect on real investment decisions. Subsequently, real investment decisions impact cost 
of capital (Lambert et al. 2007). Doyle et al. (2007) “find that weaknesses are generally 
associated with poorly estimated accruals that are not realized as cash flows” (Doyle et 
al. 2007b, 1141).  Similarly, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) find that firms that report 
MW appear to have a lower level of FRQ.  
Following the empirical evidence that a relation exists between FRQ and MW, 
research has also established that firms that report MW also have higher costs of capital 
compared to firms that do not report MW. Beneish et al. (2008) report that firms that 
disclose Section 302 MW exhibit a significant increase in cost of equity. Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2009) also document a higher cost of capital is associated with reporting 
MW using a mixed sample of Section 302 and Section 404 disclosures. Gordon and 
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Wilford (2012) reconcile these mixed results and find clear evidence to support the 
hypothesis that MW disclosed through Section 404 reports lead to a higher cost of 
capital. Additionally, it is the remediation of MW that leads to a decrease in cost of 
capital. 
As seen from the research cited above, the relation between FRQ, cost of capital, 
and MW has been clearly established in the literature.  However, Lambert et al. (2007) 
also link FRQ, which is clearly linked MW, to real investment decisions. The Lambert et 
al. (2007) model suggests “information quality is important because it affects the 
market’s ability to direct firms’ capital allocation choices” (Lambert et al. 2007, 409).  
Additionally, Feng et al. (2009) establish a link between MW disclosure and management 
forecast accuracy. They find that MW “not only [have] implications for reported 
earnings. . . , but also likely [affect] internal reports used by management to form 
projections such as earnings expectations” (Feng et al. 2009, 207).  
Biddle and Hillary (2006) find that higher FRQ improves investment efficiency 
by reducing information asymmetry. Furthermore, Biddle et al. (2009) build upon this 
research and find that a higher FRQ, proxied by accruals quality, reduces both 
overinvestment and underinvestment. Chen et al. (2011) extend this research, that is 
focused upon large U.S. publicly traded companies, to a set of private firms in emerging 
markets and confirm that under these conditions FRQ is also positively related to 
investment efficiency. A recent working paper by Cheng et al. (2011) re-examines the 
link between FRQ, proxied by MW, and investment efficiency using the empirical 
models developed through Biddle et al. (2009). The main focus of Cheng et al. (2011) 
revolves around the disclosure of MW and they suggest that their results provide 
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evidence that disclosure mitigates investment inefficiency because of the subsequent 
reduction in information asymmetry (Cheng et al. 2011). However, merely disclosing 
MW does not resolve poor FRQ. As discussed previously, Feng et al. (2009) find that 
MW lead to poor management guidance accuracy and this could subsequently impact 
managers’ real investment decisions.  
Cheng et al. (2011) provide a first glance at the effects of MW upon real 
investment decisions. However, it is unclear whether the mitigation of investment 
inefficiencies are a result of MW disclosure or MW remediation. Additionally, Cheng et 
al. (2011) do not examine how continuing to report MW in multiple consecutive year 
impacts investment efficiency. Cheng et al. (2011) utilize a mixed sample of MW firms 
even though key distinctions exist between Sections 302 and 404 of SOX.  
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Based on the above discussions, it is reasonable to believe that MW are directly 
linked to FRQ and subsequently managerial decisions. Biddle et al. (2009) recognize and 
find evidence that increased FRQ mitigates investment inefficiencies. Cheng et al. (2011) 
provide a follow-up study to Biddle et al. (2009) and find evidence that MW disclosure 
also mitigates investment inefficiency. However, merely disclosing MW will not increase 
the quality of financial information. In fact, Feng et al. (2009) find that it is the presence 
of MW that leads to inaccurate management guidance and these MW result in lower 
FRQ. Instead of focusing on disclosure as the mechanism that improves FRQ, 
considering remediation over multiple years may lend support to and provide a greater 
understanding of how MW, as a proxy for FRQ, can impact real firm investment 
decisions.  
Evidence from Gordon et al. (2012) reveals that although some firms will quickly 
remediate their MW following disclosure, other firms are slow to remediate and will 
report MW in two, three, or even more consecutive years. Thus, while Cheng et al. 
(2011) note that firms that report FRQ issues (MW) in a single year experience 
investment inefficiencies, continuing to report FRQ issues (MW) in multiple consecutive 
years may act as a signal that firms with MW are ineffectively monitoring.  Additionally, 
it is these later firms (i.e., firms reporting MW in multiple consecutive years), in 
particular, where we would expect to empirically observe greater investment inefficiency 
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as a result of reporting FRQ issues (MW). This leads to the following two general 
hypotheses (stated in the alternative form). 
H1:  Disclosing FRQ issues (MW) within a particular year will result in a 
higher level of investment inefficiency. 
 
H2:  Disclosing FRQ issues (MW) within multiple consecutive years will have 
a larger impact on investment inefficiency for those firms making such 
disclosures than for firms that do not report FRQ issues (MW) in consecutive 
years. 
 
As firms continue to report FRQ issues (MW) in multiple consecutive years, real 
investment decisions will continue to be impacted. I expect that greater investment 
inefficiency will be perpetuated as a result of the inaccuracies in the internal information 
managers are using to make decisions (Feng et al. 2009). As a corollary to the second 
hypothesis noted above, I examine a third hypothesis that is stated below (stated in the 
alternative form):  
 H3:  The greater the number of multiple consecutive years that FRQ issues 
(MW) are disclosed, the larger the investment inefficiency for firms making 
such disclosures. 
 
Until recently the bulk of the internal control literature has centered around 
defining the strength of internal control dichotomously as the presence or absence of MW 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008) or a break-down of MW 
based upon a categorization of MW as either account-specific or entity-level (Doyle et al. 
2007a; Doyle et al. 2008; Beneish et al. 2008).8 As more information is being made 
available through databases, research is now beginning to examine the effects that 
specific types of MW have on firm performance and or managerial decisions (Feng et al. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$!As cited, research has noted that not all MW have the same impact. Although MW have been examined as 
entity-level versus account-specific, research has not yet examined whether an index can be constructed 
based on the specific types of MW reported within firms. Within Appendix B, I attempt to draw upon 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) methodology to develop a metric of internal control strength based on 
the specific types reported MW. 
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2009; Masli et al. 2010; Li et al. 2011). Prior FRQ – investment efficiency research has 
not examined the impact of investment specific FRQ issues on investment efficiency. 
This leads to our fourth hypothesis (stated in the alternative form): 
H4:  FRQ issues (MW) related to investment are more significantly related to 
investment inefficiency than other categories of FRQ issues. 
 
4.2 Empirical Study Development 
  
4.2.1 Methodology 
 To test the hypotheses defined in the previous section, I use the following OLS 
regression models to examine how FRQ issues (MW) in the current year impact firm 
investment efficiency the following year. All of the variables included in the models are 
defined in Appendix A.  
INVSTEFFii,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MWi,t +!2 *MKT _CAPi,t +!3 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!4 *LOSSi,t
+!5 *FCRi,t +!6 *SL _GRi,t +!7 *M2Bi,t +!8 *CFi,t +!9 *SDCFi,t
+!10 *SDSi,t +!11 *SDIi,t +!12 *TNGBTYi,t +!13 *KSTRi,t +!14 *MKSTRi,t
+!15 *OPCYi,t +!16 *DVDSi,t + IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
       (1) 
INVSTEFFii,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MW1i,t +!2 *MW2i,t +!3 *MW3i,t +!4 *MW 4i,t
+!5 *MKT _CAPi,t +!6 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!7 *LOSSi,t
+!8 *FCRi,t +!9 *SL _GRi,t +!10 *M2Bi,t +!11 *CFi,t +!12 *SDCFi,t
+!13 *SDSi,t +!14 *SDIi,t +!15 *TNGBTYi,t +!16 *KSTRi,t
+!17 *MKSTRi,t +!18 *OPCYi,t +!19 *DVDSi,t + IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
       (2) 
 To adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity, serial-, and cross-sectional 
correlation, I use a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year level (Petersen 2009; 
Gow et al. 2010). To account for potential industry trends that may arise while using 
panel data, I account for industry fixed-effects using the Fama and French (1997) 48-
industry classification. In line with other comparable research (Biddle et al. 2009; Cheng 
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et al. 2011) and to limit the influence of outliers, I winsorize all continuous variables at 
the 1 percent and 99 percent levels.9 
4.2.2 Dependent Variable 
 Prior investment efficiency research (e.g. Biddle et al. 2009) measures investment 
efficiency (INVSTEFF1) through a model of investment as a function of sales growth 
opportunities. The residuals of this model are then used as firm-specific proxies of 
investment efficiency. This model is described below: 
 INVSTi,t+1 = !0 +!1 *SaleGRi,t +"i,t+1              (3) 
 where: 
 !i,t+1 = INVSTEFF1i,t+1  
 Within the model described as equation (3), I measure INVSTt+1 as a firm’s total 
investment and calculate it as the sum of research and development, capital, and 
acquisition expenditures less any sales of property, plant or equipment. This value is then 
multiplied by 100 and divided by lagged total assets. SaleGRi,t is measured as the 
percentage growth in sales from year t-1 to year t.10 The deviations from expected 
investment can present themselves as either negative residuals (underinvestment) or 
positive residuals (overinvestment). Both categories are considered inefficient 
investments. The investment model, described as equation (3), is estimated cross-
sectionally, by the Fama and French (1997) industry categorization, for all year-industry 
groupings that contain at least 10 observations. I reduce any influence that outliers may 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 We also perform all analyses that are described below using non-winsorized data and the results remain 
consistent with those reported upon in the current study. 
10 Biddle et al. (2009) recognize that the corporate finance literature uses Tobin’s Q as the proxy for growth 
opportunities (Hubbard 1998). However, an actual measure of Tobin’s Q is difficult to measure and as a 
result they substitute sales growth into the equation (3) investment model. In untabulated results I estimate 
investment efficiency using Tobin’s Q, proxied by M2B, and obtain similar results.  
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have by winsorizing all variables at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. All observations 
are then categorized as overinvestment observations or underinvestment observations 
based on their residuals. 
 As an alternate measure of investment efficiency (INVSTEFF2), I use a modified 
version of equation (3) that has also been used in prior research to examine the relation 
between investment efficiency and FRQ (Chen et al. 2011). This model is described 
below: 
 INVSTi,t+1 = !0 +!1 *SaleGRi,t +!2 *NEGi,t +!3 *SaleGRi,t *NEGi,t +"i,t+1            (4) 
 where: 
 !i,t+1 = INVSTEFF2i,t+1  
 Previous research has recognized that the relation between investment and growth 
could differ depending upon whether sales increases or sales decreases (Elberly 1997). 
We follow Chen et al. (2011) and employ a piecewise linear regression model that allows 
for a differential predictability between sales increases and sales decreases. The variable 
NEGi,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if sales growth in period t is 
negative and the value of zero otherwise. All other variables that are included in the 
model are defined above. As with equation (3), equation (4) is estimated cross-
sectionally, by the Fama and French (1997) industry categorization, for all year-industry 
groupings that contain at least 10 observations.11 
4.2.3 Independent Variables 
 As stated in H1, firms that have FRQ issues (MW) are expected to experience a 
much greater investment inefficiency impact compared to firms that do not report such 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The average adjusted R2 for the investment model presented by equation (3) is 9.8%. The average 
adjusted R2 for the investment model presented by equation (4) is 11.2%. These results are comparable to 
those reported by McNichols and Stubben (2008) and Chen et al. (2011).  
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issues (MW). Additionally, we state in H2, H3, and H4 that firms that report FRQ issues 
(MW) in multiple consecutive years are expected to experience a much greater 
investment inefficiency impact compared to firms that report FRQ issues (MW) in only a 
single year. Accordingly, the key independent variables utilized within the current study 
are whether or not a firm has FRQ issues (MW) and the number of consecutive years 
(i.e., one, two, three and four or more) in which a firm reports these issues (MW).  
 Related to the above and following Gordon and Wilford (2012), we classify firms 
according to two different schemes. The first classification scheme is used within 
equation (1) and in the first scheme, my key independent variable is an indicator variable 
(MW) that is set equal to one if an observation reports FRQ issues within their financial 
reports, zero otherwise. This first classification scheme is used to test H1. If reporting 
FRQ issues in any particular year has an negative impact on investment efficiency, the 
coefficient tied to MW should be negative if the investment efficiency residual tied to the 
observation falls into the underinvestment category and positive if the investment 
efficiency residual tied to the observation falls into the overinvestment category. 
 The second classification scheme is used to examine the remaining hypotheses 
(H2, H3, and H4) and is tested using equation (2). The key independent variables in 
equation (2) represent the number of consecutive years FRQ issues are reported and are 
specified as four indicator variables. The first indicator variable, MW1, is equal to one for 
observations of FRQ issues associated with firms that have not previously reported FRQ 
issues (zero otherwise). The indicator variables for observations that report FRQ issues in 
two, three, and four or more consecutive years are MW2, MW3, and MW4, respectively. 
More specifically, a one is assigned to one of these variables in each observation of FRQ 
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issues dependent on whether the reporting of the issues within the observation represents 
a consecutive occurrence of FRQ issues in two, three, or more years.  
 If reporting FRQ issues in multiple consecutive years has a greater negative 
impact on investment efficiency than reporting FRQ issues in a single year, the 
coefficients tied to MW2, MW3, and MW4 should be more negative (positive) if the 
investment efficiency residual tied to the observation falls into the underinvestment 
(overinvestment) category than the investment residual tied to the MW1 observations 
(H2). Also, if reporting FRQ issues in multiple consecutive years has a increasingly 
negative impact on investment efficiency, as the number of consecutive years in which 
MW are reported increases, the coefficients tied to MW2, MW3, and MW4 should become 
increasingly more negative (positive) if the investment efficiency residual tied to the 
observation falls into the underinvestment (overinvestment) category (H3 and H4). 
 As additional independent variables, I include two different groups of control 
variables. The first group of variables is included to control for the determinants of firms 
that report FRQ issues (MKT_CAP, AGE_FIRM, LOSS, FCR, and SL_GR). We include 
these variables to differentiate between the effects of FRQ issues (MW) and those of firm 
characteristics that are known to be significantly associated with reporting FRQ issues 
(MW). Our choice of these variables follows the methodology of Gordon and Wilford 
(2012). Prior research on the determinants of MW indicates that firms that are smaller, 
younger, financially weaker, more complex, and grow more rapidly are more likely to 
report MW (Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008). Thus, we would expect 
that as firm size (MKT_CAP) and firm age (AGE_FIRM) increase, investment efficiency 
will also increase. MKT_CAP is defined as the logarithm of the market capitalization of 
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each observation and AGE_FIRM is defined as the logarithm of the number of years the 
firm has been reporting in the CRSP database.  
 By the same token, as the financial stability (LOSS) of a firm increases, firm 
complexity (FCR) decreases, and firm growth (SL_GR) decreases, we expect that 
investment efficiency will increase. LOSS is an indicator variable that is set equal to one 
if the sum of income before extraordinary items in years t and t-1 is less than zero, zero 
otherwise. FCR is defined as an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the firm reports 
a non-zero value for foreign currency translation, zero otherwise. SL_GR is defined as the 
decile ranking for year over year sales growth from years t-2 through t.  
 The second group of control variables has been used in the prior literature (Biddle 
et al. 2009; Cheng et al. 2011) to control for the determinants of investment level (M2B, 
CF, SDCF, SDS, SDI, TNGBTY, KSTR, MKSTR, OPCY, and DVDS). Biddle and Hillary 
(2006) find that M2B, TNGBTY, KSTR, MKSTR, DVDS, and SDCF are related to capital 
investment. More specifically, market-to-book (M2B) is included as an assessment of a 
firm’s growth opportunities (Hovakimian and Hovakimian 2009). M2B, is measured as 
total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity minus deferred taxes, 
divided by total assets. Tangibility is included to account for the cost of bankruptcy and is 
a financial constraint measure (Biddle and Hillary 2006). TNGBTY is measured as 
property, plant and equipment divided by average total assets. K-structure and mean K-
structure are measures of market leverage and are included as additional financial 
constraint measures (Biddle et al. 2009). KSTR, is a firm’s K-structure and is measured as 
long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity. 
MKSTR, is the average K-structure of firms with the same 3-digit SIC code. The payment 
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of dividends has been used to classify firms into different groupings based on financial 
constraints (Hovakimian and Hovakimian 2009). DVDS is an indicator variable set equal 
to one if dividends are paid, zero otherwise. 
 In addition to the controls for capital investment, I also include one measure of 
financial slack (CF), two measures of volatility related to sales, SDS, and investment, 
SDI, and a measure of the length of a firm’s operating cycle, OPCY. SDS and SDI are 
included to ensure the results are not simply capturing the relation between the volatility 
of investment and over and underinvestment (Biddle et al. 2009). They are measured as 
the standard deviation of sales and investment for the time period of t-5 through t-1. The 
length of a firm’s operating cycle is included to ensure that the changes in investment are 
not related to the different stages of a firm’s business cycle (Biddle et al. 2009). OPCY is 
measured as the log of receivables divided by sales plus inventory divided by cost of 
goods sold. I then multiply this total by 360 to arrive at the value I use for the OPCY 
variable. 
4.2.4 Sample Selection 
 The firms and observations included in this study are drawn from the Audit 
Analytics database. I draw my sample from all observations that include management 
internal control reports as a part of their annual financial reports in accordance with SOX 
Section 404(a) (39,593) during the time period of November 2004 (the effective date for 
reporting under Section 404) through May 2010 (fiscal year 2009). Table 4.1 summarizes 
the composition of the final sample of observations used in the current study. The initial 
total sample of 39,593 observations consists of 6,418 observations with MW and 33,175 
observations without MW (Table 4.1). 
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 Six screens are applied to the initial sample to arrive at the final sample used in the 
current study. First, duplicate observations are eliminated to ensure that each firm had at 
most only one observation included for any given year (i.e., in cases of restatements the 
last filing is retained). Second, observations associated with firms that reported MW in 
nonconsecutive years were eliminated. This elimination was implemented because such 
an approach allows me to clearly distinguish firms reporting MW in multiple consecutive 
years from firms that report MW in a single year (i.e., firms reporting MW in non-
consecutive multiple years fall somewhere between these two extremes).12 As a third 
category of elimination, I eliminate firms from the control sample that report MW in their 
Section 302 reports and subsequently do not report MW in their Section 404 reports. 
These firms are eliminated because of the potential residual effect of the Section 302 
reporting.  
 Through a fourth elimination category, I eliminate firms that partially remediate 
their MW. These firms are a subset of firms that report MW in multiple consecutive years 
and are remediating some, but not all of their MW in subsequent years. Elimination of 
this subset ensures that the current study does not capture any investment efficiency 
benefits that may be associated with partial remediating, thereby diluting the impact, of 
FRQ issues (MW) on investment efficiency. Fifth, I eliminate financial firms because of 
the different nature of investment that is associated with these firms. This category of 
elimination is consistent with the prior literature (Biddle et al. 2009). Finally, all 
observations that do not have the Compustat data available to calculate the variables used 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"%!For comparison purposes, however, we did consider firms that report MW in multiple non-consecutive 
years within our sample time period as an alternative to compare to the firms that report MW in a single 
year. The results of this analysis fall between the two extremes of reporting MW in a single year and 
reporting MW in multiple consecutive years 
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within the current study and discussed above are eliminated. Following these categories 
of elimination, the analyses in the current study are performed using a total of 21,497 
observations and this total consists of 1,272 observations with MW and 20,225 
observations without MW.13 The 1,272 observations of firms with MW are further broken 
down by MW classification and these results indicate that 1002, 191, 58, and 21 of these 
observations are classified as MW1, MW2, MW3, and MW4 observations, respectively 
(Table 4.1, Panel B). 
 Through H4, I investigate if investment efficiency is more significantly impacted 
by investment specific FRQ issues (MW) rather than other types of FRQ issues (MW). 
Audit Analytics categorizes MW by the accounts that are impacted by the MW. We 
define the MW as investment related if the type of MW reported is categorized by Audit 
Analytics into any of the following categories: (1) Capitalization of expenditure issues, 
(2) Depreciation, depletion, or amortization issues, or (3) PPE, intangible, or fixed asset 
(value/diminution) issues. After we perform this categorization, we find that 420 firms 
report investment specific FRQ issues (MW). These investment specific FRQ issues are 
each classified according to my scheme described above and the results of this 
classification indicate that 330, 66, and 24 of these observations are classified as MW1, 
MW2, and MW3 observations, respectively. These results are reported in Panel B of Table 
4.1.    
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The significant decline in the number of observations is due mostly to the inclusion of non-accelerated 
filers in the initial sample. These firms are smaller, and Compustat data is not available for the majority of 
firms that fall into this category. 
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5.1 Primary Empirical Results 
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 presents univariate statistics separately for observations that fall into the 
control category (firms that do not report FRQ issues) and observations that fall into the 
various FRQ issues categories (i.e., MW1, MW2, MW3, and MW4). Panel A presents the 
control group characteristics compared to the complete FRQ issues (MW) group 
characteristics. As a complete group, firms that report FRQ issues have a higher 
percentage of investment. Consistent with prior research, firms that report FRQ issues 
(MW) are smaller, younger, report losses more frequently, and report foreign income 
more frequently (Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Gordon and Wilford 
2012). Additionally, these firms have higher variability in their cash flows, sales and 
investment. Finally, firms that report FRQ issues are less likely to distribute dividends. 
Panel B displays the descriptive statistics of the complete MW group and the 
MW1 group. Panel C displays the descriptive statistics of the MW1 group and the MW2 
group. Panel D displays the descriptive statistics of the MW2 group and the MW3 group. 
Finally, Panel E displays the descriptive statistics of the MW3 group and the MW4 group. 
As firms continue to report FRQ issues (MW) in multiple consecutive years, the 
percentage of investment decreases, firm size and age increase, and the percentage of 
firms reporting losses and the percentage of firms with foreign operations increase. These 
results are consistent with prior research (Gordon and Wilford 2012). The remaining 
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characteristics stay relatively consistent as firms continue to report these issues in 
multiple consecutive years. 
Since the firm level investment could refer to either underinvestment or 
overinvestment, I examine investment efficiency broken down according to these two 
different categories. The results of this examination are included in Figure 5.1. Panel A 
presents the results of firms with negative investment residuals (underinvestment), Panel 
B presents the results of firms with positive investment residuals (overinvestment). Firms 
that are included in the underinvestment category report a higher level of 
underinvestment (more negative residuals) when they also report FRQ issues (MW). 
Additionally, as firms continue to report these issues in multiple consecutive years, the 
underinvestment residuals increase (Panel A). Firms that are included in the 
overinvestment category report a higher level of overinvestment (more positive residuals) 
when they also report FRQ issues (MW). As firms continue to report these issues in 
multiple consecutive years, the overinvestment residuals increase (Panel B). 
5.1.2 Single Category Regression Analyses 
Table 5.2 presents the OLS regression results for the test of H1 using equation 
(1).14 Following the research design of Chen et al. (2011) we estimate equation (1) 
separately for firms that fall into the underinvestment and overinvestment categories. 
Estimating these categories separately allows us to investigate whether FRQ issues have 
an amplifying effect on both types of inefficiencies. Underinvestment residuals are used 
as the dependent variable in the first two columns and overinvestment residuals are used 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 We test the Variance Inflation Factors for all variables in each regression and find that the maximum 
factor is less than 5 for each variable. The variance inflation factor quantifies the severity of 
multicollinearity in OLS regression analyses. It is a measure of how much the variance of an estimated 
regression coefficient increases due to collinearity.  
!
! ! !47 
as the dependent variable in the last two columns. Columns (1) and (3) display the 
regression results associated with using INVSTEFF1 as the dependent variable.  Columns 
(2) and (4) display the regression results associated with using INVSTEFF2 as the 
dependent variable. The regression models have adjusted R2s ranging from 15.6 percent 
to 43.8 percent, with higher explanatory power being attributed to the underinvestment 
models. This is due to the prevalence of underinvestment within our sample and is in line 
with prior research (Chen et al. 2011).  
Over all four specifications of the equation (1) pooled regression analysis we 
reach the same conclusion, FRQ issues (MW) have a negative impact on investment 
efficiency. More specifically, we find that within underinvestment regressions (columns 1 
and 2), the two estimated MW coefficients are both negative and significant at the 0.01 
level. The two estimated MW coefficients are both positive and significant at the 0.01 and 
the 0.05 level for columns (3) and (4) in the overinvestment regressions. We see that 
these results are robust to the inclusion of both firm-level characteristics and industry 
fixed effects. The results associated with the control variables are consistent with our 
expectations and with prior research.  
The results in Table 5.2 suggest that when firms report FRQ issues (MW), 
investment efficiency decreases, consistent with H1. These results imply that FRQ issues 
negatively impact management’s ability to efficiently allocate funds to their investments. 
5.1.3 Multiple Category Regression Analyses 
Table 5.3 presents the OLS regression results for the tests of H2 and H3 using 
equation (2). Once again, following the research design of Chen et al. (2011) I estimate 
equation (2) separately for firms that fall into the underinvestment and overinvestment 
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categories. Columns 1 and 3 display the regression results associated with using 
INVSTEFF1 as the dependent variable. Columns 2 and 4 display the regression results 
associated with using INVSTEFF2 as the dependent variable. Underinvestment residuals 
are used as the dependent variable in the first two columns and overinvestment residuals 
are used as the dependent variable in the last two columns. These regression models have 
adjusted R2s ranging from 16.6 percent to 44.9 percent, with higher explanatory power 
being attributed to the underinvestment models. We observe that breaking the FRQ issues 
variable (MW) down into different categories based on the number of years in which 
FRQ issues are reported increases the explanatory power of the models. 
Over all four specifications of the equation (2) pooled regression analysis we 
reach the same conclusion, FRQ issues that are reported in multiple consecutive years 
have a greater negative impact on investment efficiency than FRQ issues that are reported 
in a single year. Additionally, the results indicate that as firms continue to report these in 
multiple consecutive years the negative impact on investment efficiency increases. More 
specifically, we find that within the underinvestment regressions displayed in columns 1 
and 2, the four FRQ issues estimated coefficients are negative and significant in column 1 
and three of the four coefficients are significant in column 2. Also, the investment 
inefficiency for underinvestment is increasing at an increasing rate as firms continue to 
report FRQ issues in multiple consecutive years. On the other hand, we find that within 
the overinvestment regressions displayed in columns 3 and 4 the FRQ issues estimated 
coefficients are positive and significant for all MW categories. The investment 
inefficiency for overinvestment is also increasing at an increasing rate as firms continue 
to report FRQ issues in multiple consecutive years. These results are robust to the 
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inclusion of both firm-level characteristics and industry fixed effects. The results 
associated with the control variables are consistent with our expectations and with prior 
research.  
The results in Table 5.3 suggest that the negative impact on investment efficiency is 
larger as firms continue to report FRQ issues in multiple consecutive years, consistent 
with H2. Additionally, as firms continue to report FRQ issues in multiple consecutive 
years, investment efficiency will decrease at an increasing rate, consistent with H3. These 
results indicate that FRQ issues that are reported in multiple consecutive years have a 
much larger negative impact on a firm’s FRQ and further hinder management’s ability to 
efficiently allocate funds to their investments. 
5.1.4 Investment Specific Regression Analyses 
We present the investment specific FRQ issues OLS regression results for 
equation (2) in Table 5.4, columns 1, 3, 5, and 7. We compare the investment specific 
FRQ issues OLS regression results to results that arise from the OLS regression of 
equation (2) using all other types of FRQ issues (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). Results for 
underinvestment are presented in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6. Results for overinvestment are 
presented in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8. The first four columns present the results using 
INVSTEFF1 as the dependent variable and the last four columns present the results using 
INVSTEFF2 as the dependent variable. These regression models have adjusted R2s 
ranging from 15.5 percent to 45.9 percent, with higher explanatory power being 
attributed to the models that present only investment specific FRQ issues. Since the 
sample of investment specific issues does not include any MW4 observations, we have 
eliminated these observations from the other groups to facilitate comparability. 
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The results in Table 5.4 confirm the results presented in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, firms 
that report FRQ issues experience a decline in investment efficiency. This decline in 
investment efficiency is amplified as firms continue to report these FRQ issues in 
multiple consecutive years. The results in Table 5.4 add to the previous results. These 
results provide evidence that investment specific FRQ issues are driving the decline in 
investment efficiency. More specifically, we find that within column 1, the coefficients 
associated with FRQ issues categories are negative and significant at the 0.01 level for all 
MW variables when investment specific FRQ issues are used in the analysis. However, 
column 2 provides evidence that the coefficients that are associated with all other FRQ 
issues are not as significant. These results hold for all underinvestment and 
overinvestment comparisons. 
The results in Table 5.4 suggest that the impact of FRQ issues on investment 
efficiency is most likely being driven by investment specific FRQ issues, consistent with 
H4. These results indicate that investment specific FRQ issues have a greater impact on 
the quality of the information that is used in making investment decisions. 
Table 5.5 provides a summary of the results of the analyses that are discussed 
above. More specifically, Table 5.5 lists the hypotheses, the equations used to test those 
hypotheses, whether the hypotheses are confirmed, and the tables in which the results are 
listed. 
5.2 Additional Analyses 
 
5.2.1 Timing Differences 
 
 Moral hazard and adverse selection research recognizes that information 
asymmetry leads to underinvestment or overinvestment ex-post (Jensen 1986; Lambert et 
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al. 2007; Myers and Majluf 1984). The models (equations 1 and 2) used in the main 
analyses of this current study are based on models established and used in the prior 
literature that examines the relation between investment efficiency and FRQ with respect 
to moral hazard and adverse selection (Biddle et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2011). As such, the 
models in the current study examine the impact of FRQ on ex-post investment efficiency.  
 Although I recognize the arguments of the previous literature that model the FRQ 
investment efficiency relation as described above, the current study is seeking to examine 
how FRQ issues, proxied by MW, impact investment efficiency. These FRQ issues likely 
have a concurrent relation with investment efficiency because they may be adversely 
impacting the information that is used to make investment decisions in the current period. 
As such, this relation can also be examined contemporaneously. To do so, I re-examine 
equations 1 and 2 using the following model specifications: 
INVSTEFFii,t = !0 +!1 *MWi,t +!2 *MKT _CAPi,t +!3 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!4 *LOSSi,t
+!5 *FCRi,t +!6 *SL _GRi,t +!7 *M2Bi,t +!8 *CFi,t +!9 *SDCFi,t
+!10 *SDSi,t +!11 *SDIi,t +!12 *TNGBTYi,t +!13 *KSTRi,t +!14 *MKSTRi,t
+!15 *OPCYi,t +!16 *DVDSi,t + IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
     (5) 
INVSTEFFii,t = !0 +!1 *MW1i,t +!2 *MW2i,t +!3 *MW3i,t +!4 *MW 4i,t +!5 *MKT _CAPi,t
+!6 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!7 *LOSSi,t +!8 *FCRi,t +!9 *SL _GRi,t +!10 *M2Bi,t
+!11 *CFi,t +!12 *SDCFi,t +!13 *SDSi,t +!14 *SDIi,t +!15 *TNGBTYi,t
+!16 *KSTRi,t +!17 *MKSTRi,t +!18 *OPCYi,t +!19 *DVDSi,t
+IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
 (6) 
  Allowing for the above contemporaneous examination of the FRQ – investment 
efficiency relation, permits me to expand the sample to include FRQ issues that are 
reported in fiscal year 2010. The results from this analysis remain robust to the results of 
the main analysis (i.e., all four hypotheses are confirmed). Due to the similarities between 
the main analysis results and the results cited in the current section, the results remain 
untabulated. 
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5.2.2 Replication of Previous Research 
 
Because of the similar focus of the current study to the Biddle et al. (2009) and 
Cheng et al. (2011) studies, I replicate these two previous studies using the current 
study’s sample data to ensure that the results described above are not the result of 
differences in the samples of the prior studies. Additionally, I replicate these studies to 
prove that my results are robust to the implications of the previous studies. 
5.2.2.1 Biddle et al. (2009) Replication 
 Biddle et al. (2009) use a conditional regression model and a multinomial logit 
model to predict the likelihood that a firm will either overinvest or underinvest. My 
remarks in this section focus upon the multinomial logit model because of the overlap 
between the Biddle et al. (2009) and Cheng et al. (2011) models. The conditional model 
will be the focus of the Cheng et al. (2011) replication in the next section.  
The Biddle et al. (2009) results using a multinomial logit model indicate that 
firms with higher FRQ, proxied by accruals quality, will make more efficient investments 
(Biddle et al. 2009). Within their model, they sort the firms yearly based on the residuals 
that are obtained from equation (3). These residuals are then formed into quartiles 
(INVSTQ). The bottom quartile (most negative residuals) represents underinvestment, the 
middle two quartiles represent the base group, and the upper quartile (most positive 
residuals) represents overinvestment. Within this study, Biddle et al. (2009) use many of 
the same control variables that we employ in the current study and the model that is used 
to present this multinomial logistic regression is presented below as equation (5). All 
variables listed below are defined in Appendix A. 
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INVSTQi,t+1 = !0 +!1 *AQi,t +!2 * INSTITi,t +!3 *ANLYTi,t +!4 * IG _ SCOREi,t
+!5 *DG _ SCOREi,t +!6 *LGASSTi,t +!7 *M2Bi,t +!8 *SDCFi,t +!9 *SDSi,t
+!10 *SDIi,t +!11 *Z _ SCi,t +!12 *TNGBTYi,t +!13 *KSTRi,t +!14 *MKSTRi,t
+!15 *CFi,t +!16 *DVDSi,t +!17 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!18 *OPCYi,t +!19 *LOSSi,t
       (5) 
 The results obtained through my replication of Biddle et al. (2009) are displayed 
as Table 5.6. The results of the underinvestment quartile compared to the base case are 
displayed in columns 1 and 2. The results of the overinvestment quartile compared to the 
base case are displayed in columns 3 and 4. My replication results mirror those of Biddle 
et al. (2009). I find that for the time period of November 2004 through May 2010, firms 
that have higher FRQ (AQ) will exhibit greater investment efficiency. The similarity of 
the results that I obtain through my replication imply that FRQ, whether calculated as the 
presence of issues with MW or as accruals quality has an impact on firm investment 
efficiency. 
5.2.2.2 Cheng et al. (2011) Replication 
 Rather than model investment efficiency as a deviation from expected investment, 
Cheng et al. (2011) follow Biddle et al. (2009) and use a conditional model to determine 
whether FRQ, proxied by reported MW, acts as a signal and curbs inefficient 
investments. Two different models are used to examine their hypotheses. These models 
are displayed below as equations (6) and (7). 
INVSTi,t = !0 +!1 *MWFIRMi,t!1 +!2 *MWFIRMi,t!1 * IEi,t + "i *MWFIRMDeti,t!1"
+ # i * INVDeti,t!1 +" $i *GOVi,t!1 +" $i *GOVi,t!1 * IEi,t"
      (6) 
INVSTi = !0 +!1 *MWFIRMi,t!1 +!2 *MWFIRMi,t!1 * IEi,t +!3 *MWFIRMi,t+1
+!4 *MWFIRMi,t+1 * IEi,t+2 +!5 *MWFIRMi,t+2 +!6 *MWFIRMi,t+2 * IEi,t+3
+ "i *MWFIRMDeti" + # i * INVDeti +" $i *GOVi +" $i *GOVi * IEi"
        (7) 
 Equation (6) is used to examine whether firms that report MW and are financially 
constrained are more likely to underinvest and overinvest. Equation (7) is used to 
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examine whether investment inefficiencies are reduced in the years following disclosure 
of MW. I employ the same methodology followed by Cheng et al. (2011) and replicate 
their study using my sample that draws observations from November 2004 through May 
2010. All variables listed in the equations above are defined in Appendix A. The results 
of my replication are displayed in Table 5.7. Column 1 of Table 5.7 displays my results 
using equation (6) and column 2 displays my results using equation (7).  
 The main results of the equation (6) replication lie in the coefficients that are 
attached to the MWFIRM variable and the MWFIRM*IE interaction. IE is obtained by 
taking an average of the decile rankings of firm cash balances and leverage.15  This 
average is then scaled to a range between zero and one. An IE close to zero is indicative 
of a firm that is financially constrained and would be a potential indicator of an increased 
likelihood of underinvesting. MWFIRM is an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the 
firm reports MW in year t.  
The results of my replication of equation (6) in Table 5.7, column 1, indicate that 
as IE draws closer to a value of one, the likelihood of over-investment increases. More 
specifically, firms that report MW and have low cash balances coupled with high levels 
of leverage (financially constrained firms) are associated with underinvestment (indicated 
through a negative and significant coefficient attached to !1). On the other hand, firms 
that report MW and have high cash balances coupled with low levels of leverage 
(financially unconstrained firms) are more likely to overinvest (indicated through a 
positive and significant coefficient attached to (!1+!3). 
 The main results of the Cheng et al. (2011) equation (7) replication lie in the 
coefficients that are attached to the MWFIRM variables and the MWFIRM*IE 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"&!Leverage is multiplied by negative one so that it can be directly related to the cash balances decile. 
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interactions. The results of our replication in Table 5.7, column 3, indicate that firms that 
report MW with low cash balances coupled with high levels of leverage (financially 
constrained firms) are associated with underinvestment in years t+1 and t-1. On the other 
hand, firms that report MW and have high cash balances coupled with low levels of 
leverage (financially unconstrained firms) are more likely to overinvest in year t-1 only. 
Cheng et al. (2011) conclude, from these results, that disclosure produces an increase in 
investment efficiency.  
5.2.3 The Role of Remediation in Increasing Investment Efficiency 
 Whereas Cheng et al. (2011) argue that disclosure increases investment 
efficiency, the current study argues that it is remediation of FRQ issues (MW) that 
increases investment efficiency. Further data analysis is required to investigate why the 
results of the current study reveal that firms continue to invest inefficiently and to an 
increasing degree after first reporting FRQ issues. The Cheng et al. (2011) results 
indicate that firms invest more efficiently following disclosure of FRQ issues. A high 
level analysis of the firms that report these issues indicates that of the firms that report 
FRQ issues in year t, roughly 50 percent have remediated these issues by year t+1. 
Additionally, roughly 50 percent of firms that continue report FRQ issues in year t+1 
remediate these issues by year t+2.  
To examine the relation between the Cheng et al. (2011) results and my results I 
remove the firms that remediate MW from the Cheng et al. (2011) sample and rerun the 
equation (7) regression analyses. In these untabulated results I find that firms that 
continue to report FRQ issues in multiple consecutive years experience an increase in 
their investment inefficiency in support of this study’s main argument. More specifically, 
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these results indicate the underinvestment and overinvestment are significantly present in 
years t+1 and t+2. 
 To provide robustness to my results, I also adapted this conditional analysis to 
investigate the FRQ – investment efficiency relation in the context of remediation. I 
integrate the conditional tests that are used in both Biddle et al. (2009) and Cheng et al. 
(2011) to examine the conditional impact that reporting FRQ issues (MW) in multiple 
consecutive years may have on investment. The model that I use to examine this 
conditional impact is displayed below as equation (8). 
INVSTi,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MW1i,t +!2 *MW2i,t +!3 *MW3i,t +!4 *MW 4i,t +!5 * IEi,t+1
+!6 *MW1i,t * IEi,t+1 +!7 *MW2i,t * IEi,t+1 +!8 *MW3i,t * IEi,t+1
+!9 *MW 4i,t * IEi,t+1 +!10 *MKT _CAPi,t +!11 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!12 *LOSSi,t
+!13 *FCRi,t +!14 *SL _GRi,t +!15 *M2Bi,t +!16 *CFi,t +!17 *SDCFi,t
+!18 *SDSi,t +!19 *SDIi,t +!20 *TNGBTYi,t +!21 *KSTRi,t
+!22 *MKSTRi,t +!23 *OPCYi,t +!24 *DVDSi,t + IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
         (8) 
 Using the model displayed as equation (8) above, I perform an OLS regression 
and the results are displayed as Table 5.8. These results indicate that firms that report 
FRQ issues (MW) tend to underinvest compared to firms that do not report FRQ issues 
(MW) (!1<0, !2<0, !3<0, !4<0). Also, firms that report FRQ issues (MW), have low 
levels of cash, and have high levels of leverage tend to underinvest to a greater degree as 
they continue to report FRQ issues (MW) in multiple consecutive years. The results also 
indicate that firms that report FRQ issues (MW), have high levels of cash, and have low 
levels of leverage tend to overinvest compared to firms that do not report FRQ issues 
(MW) (!1+!6>0, !2+!7>0, !3+!8>0, !4+!9>0). Additionally, firms that report FRQ 
issues (MW) overinvest to a greater degree as they continue to report FRQ issues (MW) 
in multiple consecutive years. 
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5.2.4 Change Analysis 
 The main analyses measure the INVSTEFF1 and INVSTEFF2 variables (i.e., the 
dependent variables) in terms of the level of the residuals. However, to provide additional 
robustness to the results, I recomputed equation (2) with the INVSTEFF1 and 
INVSTEFF2 variables measured in terms of changes in INVSTEFF1 and INVSTEFF2. 
Given the possibility that other events and firm factors could concurrently affect 
investment, the results using a change measure of the investment residuals provide 
additional support to the main results concerning the relation between FRQ issues and 
investment efficiency, as well as the negative relation between reporting such issues in 
multiple consecutive years and investment efficiency. I calculate the change in 
investment efficiency for each year t observation as the difference between the 
investment efficiency residuals in year t and year t-1.  
 By substituting a change in investment inefficiency variable in for the levels 
variable of investment inefficiency in the analysis, I can control for firm-specific omitted 
variables. The change in investment inefficiency model translates into a first difference 
model and is equivalent in its estimation to a fixed effects model (Wooldridge 2002). By 
subtracting INVSTEFFt from INVSTEFFt+1, the fixed effects are cancelled out and the 
omitted variable bias is mitigated (Gordon et al. 2010). 
 Based on this change measure of CE, I recomputed the equation (2) OLS 
regression analyses to assess whether the results remain robust to this new measure of the 
dependent variable. The findings show that the previous results are robust when we 
measure investment efficiency as a change variable. More specifically, as shown in Table 
5.9, the results indicate that FRQ issues (MW) are associated with an increase in 
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investment inefficiency that intensifies as a firm continues to report these issues in 
consecutive years. 
5.2.5 Additional Control Variables 
 Prior research in this area has utilized additional variables that control for FRQ, 
proxied by accruals quality, and various governance variables (Biddle et al. 2009; Cheng 
et al. 2011). To ensure that my measure of FRQ (MW) is not capturing aspects of FRQ 
that have previously been investigated, I include these additional variables.  Equation (9), 
below, models the OLS regression analysis that includes the additional control variables. 
INVSTEFFii,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MW1i,t +!2 *MW2i,t +!3 *MW3i,t +!4 *MW 4i,t
+!5 *AQi,t +!6 * INSTITi,t +!7 *ANLYTi,t +!8 * IG _ SCOREi,t
+!9 *DG _ SCOREi,t +!10 *MKT _CAPi,t +!11 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!12 *LOSSi,t
+!13 *FCRi,t +!14 *SL _GRi,t +!15 *M2Bi,t +!16 *CFi,t +!17 *SDCFi,t
+!18 *SDSi,t +!19 *SDIi,t +!20 *TNGBTYi,t +!21 *KSTRi,t
+!22 *MKSTRi,t +!23 *OPCYi,t +!24 *DVDSi,t + IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
 (9) 
 All variables listed in equation (9) are defined within Appendix A. AQ is the 
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of accruals quality (McNichols 2002). 
Including AQ helps to account for any differences that may exist between FRQ related to 
earnings and FRQ related to internal control. The remaining four additional variables are 
corporate governance variables that could also have a potential impact on investment 
efficiency. Four different measures of corporate governance are included because they 
each play a different role in monitoring and governance. INSTIT is included to represent 
institutional shareholders, ANALYT is included to represent analyst following, and 
IG_SCORE is included to account for a composite of other corporate governance factors. 
Because there are only a limited number of firms that have a calculated governance index 
(IG_SCORE), I also include DG_SCORE, a dummy variable that indicates whether or not 
the IG_SCORE is available for a particular firm (Biddle et al. 2009).  
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 The results of the OLS regression that uses equation (9) are displayed within 
Table 5.10. The results indicate that even when additional variables to control for FRQ 
and corporate governance are included, the results are robust to this alternative 
specification. These results imply that MW as a measure of FRQ provides information 
about investment efficiency above and beyond the information that is provided through 
measures of earnings quality and corporate governance. 
5.3       Implications and Conclusion 
 The new financial reporting requirements associated with SOX have defined 
internal control as internal control over financial reporting. Since firms are now required 
to report on this category of internal control, FRQ can be directly tied to the status of a 
firm’s internal control reports. Recently, accounting researchers have examined the 
relation between FRQ and investments (Biddle and Hillary 2006; Biddle et al. 2009; 
Chen et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2011). Additionally, Lambert et al. (2007) indicate that 
FRQ has an impact on real investment decisions at the firm level.  
 The current study uses MW as a proxy for FRQ (Cheng et al. 2011; Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman 2011) and examines the relation between this new measure of FRQ 
and investment efficiency. Building on the research of Gordon and Wilford (2012), the 
current study examines the impact of poor FRQ in multiple consecutive years on 
investment efficiency. Additionally, I examine whether MW that are specifically related 
to investment have a more significant impact on investment efficiency 
  My findings provide evidence that MW, as a proxy for FRQ, have a negative 
impact on investment efficiency. More specifically, the current study shows that 
investment inefficiency increases as the number of consecutive years in which the firm 
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reports FRQ issues (MW) increases. Additionally, the results indicate that investment 
inefficiencies are being driven by investment specific FRQ issues (MW). Prior research 
has used accruals quality as a proxy for FRQ (McNichols and Stubben 2008; Biddle et al. 
2009). The results from the current study are robust to alternative model specifications, a 
change in investment efficiency specification and the inclusion of additional control and 
governance variables in our equation (2) analyses. 
 My results have many implications, the following two of which seem most notable. 
First these results imply that MW, as a proxy for FRQ, provides FRQ information above 
and beyond that provided by the earnings quality measures that have been used in the 
prior literature. Second, my results imply that the remediation of investment specific FRQ 
issues (MW) will have a greater impact on improving investment efficiency than 
remediation of other types of FRQ issues (MW). 
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Chapter 6 Summary and Discussion 
  
 
This dissertation explores the historical context and literature surrounding internal 
control regulation and then presents studies that are tied to a primary objective and a 
secondary objective. 
Chapter 2 sheds light on the historical context of the current internal control 
regulatory environment. Additionally, Chapter 2 provides a high level overview of the 
research that has resulted from the firm specific internal control data that is now available 
within the quarterly reports (Section 302 of SOX) and the annual reports (Section 404 of 
SOX). The research related to SOX and internal control spans several different 
accounting research areas (i.e., financial accounting, managerial accounting, auditing, 
etc.). Of the limitations attached to the review presented in Chapter 2, the following two 
seem most relevant. First, the research presented provides a brief overview rather than 
additional insight into the literature. Future examinations of this literature could develop 
a framework that helps to weave together the different results and insights. Second, 
because of the breadth of literature that is discussed, a deep analysis of particular internal 
control literature topics is not feasible. Future reviews of this literature may select a 
couple of the topics that were reviewed above and provide a more in-depth analysis. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 investigate the primary objective of the current study, to re-
examine and substantially extend the MW-investment inefficiency relation. This study 
uses the presence or absence of reported MW as a proxy for FRQ. Using a sample of 
firms that filed internal control reports from November 2004 through May 2010, I 
examine the relation between firms that report FRQ issues and investment inefficiency. I 
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measure investment inefficiency as the deviation from expected investment, where 
expected investment is measured as a function of sales growth. Investment inefficiency 
presents itself as either underinvestment (negative deviations) or overinvestment (positive 
deviations). My results indicate that FRQ issues (MW) are linked to investment 
inefficiency. Additionally, I examine and find evidence to support my hypothesis that 
FRQ issues (MW) in multiple consecutive years impact investment inefficiency to a 
greater degree. Furthermore, as a firm continues to report FRQ issues the degree of 
investment inefficiency will continue to increase. These results imply that FRQ issues 
negatively impact the information used to make real investment decisions. I also examine 
and find evidence to support my hypothesis that investment inefficiencies are being 
driven by investment specific FRQ issues. The results of this study are robust to 
specifying investment inefficiency as a change variable, including additional control 
variables, and analyzing investment inefficiency through a conditional model. 
There are limitations associated with all empirical studies; however, the following 
two seem to be most notable. First, the implications of the residual measure of investment 
efficiency are unclear. The fit of the model that estimates investment efficiency is quite 
low (10%). Additionally as a result of issues related to the fit of the investment estimation 
model, each firm in the sample suffers from investment inefficiency to some degree. 
Future research could examine the significance of the residuals to ensure that the 
investment inefficiency that is being associated with my measure of investment 
inefficiency is significantly different than zero. Also, it would be helpful to derive a 
statistically significant estimate of the optimal investment level. Second, agency concerns 
are not considered in this study. Even though previous studies that have examined 
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investment efficiency have focused on agency concerns, the agency implications tied to 
having FRQ issues in multiple consecutive years should be considered. 
The above limitations notwithstanding, the research provided above offers 
valuable insight that expands our knowledge of the role of internal control and negative 
consequences that can be linked to reporting specific types of MW. This study confirms 
the theoretical argument posited by Lambert et al. (2007) that FRQ impacts real 
investment decisions.
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Table 2.1 
Internal Control Legislation: Cross-country Comparison+ 
 
Country Canada France Japan United Kingdom United States 
Internal Control Requirements ! ! ! ! ! 
Mandatory Compliance ! ! ! ! ! 











Operations " ! " ! " 
Financial Reporting ! ! ! ! ! 




Identify and evaluate ! ! ! ! ! 
Respond ! ! ! ! ! 
Conclude on 
effectiveness ! " ! ! ! 
Disclose 
Overall process " ! ! ! " 
Management of 
specific risks " ! ! " " 
Effectiveness 
conclusion ! " ! " ! 
IT Response " " ! " " 
Framework COSO, CoCo, Turnbull " COSO Turnbull 
COSO, CoCo, 
Turnbull 










Rules-based Rules-based Principles-Based Rules-based 
 
+Adapted from FEE (2005), Appendix III  
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Table 2.2 
Summary of the Internal Control Literature Post-SOX 
 
Literature Sub-
Section Topic Key Points Authors 
2.4.1 Determinants of Internal Control Firms with MW are smaller, more complex, less profitable Ge and McVay (2005) 
  Firms with MW are younger, have higher rates of growth and 
have undergone restructuring 
Doyle et al. (2007a) 
  Results driven by entity-level MW  
  Firms with MW have fewer resources to devote to internal 
control 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2007) 
  Firms with MW face greater control risk  
2.4.2 Financial Reporting Quality and Internal 
Control  
Firms with MW have lower earnings quality Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2008); Doyle et al. 
(2007b) 
  There is a positive relation between firms with MW and 
earnings management 
Chan et al. (2008) 
  Firms with strong internal control have a higher level of 
financial reporting quality 
Nagy (2010) 
  Inaccurate data caused by MW leads to inaccurate 
management guidance 
Feng et al. (2009) 
  There is a positive relation between conservatism and internal 
control quality 
Goh and Li (2011) 
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2.4.3 Firm Performance and 
Internal Control 
There is a negative stock price reaction to MW disclosure Hammersley et al. (2008); 
Kim and Park (2009) 
  Reporting Section 302 MW leads to negative abnormal returns; 
Reporting Section 404 MW does not 
Beneish et al. (2008) 
  Larger firms do not experience as large of a negative reaction to MW  
  Theoretical evidence that MW increase a firm’s cost of equity Lambert et al. (2007) 
  Cost of equity is not significantly higher for firms that report Section 
404 MW 
Ogneva et al. (2007); Beneish 
et al. (2008) 
  Cost of equity is significantly higher for firms that report Section 
302 MW 
Beneish et al. (2008) 
  Significant increase in cost of equity for firms that report MW Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009); 
Gordon and Wilford (2012) 
  Reconcile mixed cost of equity results Gordon and Wilford (2012) 
  Remediation of MW leads to a decrease in cost of equity Gordon and Wilford (2012) 
  Firms that report MW have an increased cost of debt Dhaliwal et al. (2011) 
  Banks charge higher interest rates to firms with MW Kim et al. (2011) 
2.4.4 Audit Fees and Internal 
Control 
Firms that report MW have higher audit fees Raghunandan and Rama 
(2006); Hoitash et al. (2008) 
  Firms that report MW are more likely to dismiss their auditor Ettredge et al. (2007) 
  Firms that pay higher audit fees are more likely to dismiss their 
auditor post-SOX 
 
  More severe MW are linked to higher audit fees and higher risk Hogan and Wilkins (2008) 
  The relation between audit fees and financial reporting risk increased 
post SOX 
Charles et al. (2010) 
  Firms that remediate their MW have lower audit fees than those that 
do not 
Munsif et al. (2011); Hoag and 
Hollingsworth (2011) 
  Audit fee premiums continue to be paid for 2 years following 
remediation 
 
  Audit costs can be reduced for small firms at no loss to quality by 
dismissing the SOX 404(b) audit requirement 
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2.4.5 The Auditor/Firm Relationship and 
Internal Control 
Initial clients post-SOX experience audit fee premiums Huang et al. (2009) 
  MW are the most significant factor associated with auditor dismissals Ettredge et al. 
(2011) 
  Auditor changes post-SOX are a function of capacity constraints Landsman et al. 
(2009) 
2.4.6 The Audit Committee and Internal 
Control 
Firms that appoint accounting financial experts to the audit committee 
experience a positive market reaction 
Defond et al. 
(2005); Hoitash et 
al. (2009) 
  Accounting financial experts impact the effectiveness of internal control  
  Firms that appoint former audit partners to their audit committee are less 
likely to report MW 
Naiker and Sharma 
(2009) 
  There is a positive relation between earnings quality and the social ties of 
board members 
Krishnan et al. 
(2011) 
  Independent audit committees with a financial expert are less likely to report 
MW (pre-SOX) 
Krishnan (2005) 
  Individuals with greater internal control experience are appointed to audit 
committees post-SOX 
Beasley (2009) 
  Audit committee compensation is positively linked to the demand for 
monitoring 
Engel et al. (2010) 
2.4.7 Economic Consequences of SOX Firms impacted by SOX experience negative abnormal returns around SOX 
related legislative events 
Zhang (2007) 
  The number of firms that file for deregistration post-SOX has increased Leuz et al. (2007) 
  SOX compliance costs have driven the increase in the number of going 
private decisions by firms 
Engel et al. (2007) 
  Large foreign firms will continue to list on the U.S. stock exchanges; Small 
foreign firms are more likely to list on the U.K. stock exchange 
Piotroski and 
Srinivasan (2008) 
  Non-accelerated filers have incentives to remain small post-SOX Gao et al. (2009) 
  Theoretical evidence that SOX improves internal control by reducing the 
incidence of fraud 
Patterson and Smith 
(2007) 
  In the long run audit costs will decrease and audit efficiency with increase in 
the post-SOX environment 
 
  Auditors detect ! of report MW, supporting the vital role of Section 404(b) Bedard and Graham 
(2011) 
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2.4.7 Economic Consequences of SOX – 
Cont. 
Smaller firms disclosing MW under SOX 404(a) at a comparable rate to 
larger firms  
Kinney and Shepardson 
(2011) 
  Corporate risk-taking has declined post-SOX Bargeron et al. (2010) 
  Option backdating has declined post-SOX Dhaliwal et al. (2009) 
  Opportunities for strategic accrual manipulation have declined post-SOX Comprix and Muller 
(2011) 
  Information security activities receive more attention post-SOX  Gordon et al. (2006) 
2.4.8 The Relation Between Corporate 
Governance and MW under SOX 
Higher levels of corporate governance quality reduce the likelihood of MW Hoitash et al. (2009) 
  Types of MW reported vary depending on the experiences of the members 
of the board of directors 
 
  External auditors indicate that positive changes in the board of directors, 
audit committee, and control environment are a part of the post-SOX 
environment 
Cohen et al. (2010) 
  There is a positive relation between timely remediation of MW and larger 
audit committees, more independent boards, and greater non-accounting 
financial expertise 
Goh (2009) 
  Firms that report MW are more likely to have a CFO with less experience Li et al. (2010) 
  CFOs in firms with poor internal control receive lower compensation and 
have higher turnover rates 
Wang (2010); 
Johnstone et al. (2011) 
  Remediation of MW is positively linked to increases in audit committee 
turnover and increases in the proportion of independent board members 
Johnstone et al. (2011) 
2.4.9 Information Technology and 
Internal Control 
Internal control monitoring technology reduces the likelihood of MW Masli et al. (2010) 
  Firms that report IT-related MW report a higher number of MW overall  Klamm and Watson 
(2009) 
  Implemented IT controls vary based on size, industry and status (public vs. 
private) 
Wallace (2011) 
  Firms with ERP systems are less likely to report MW Morris (2011) 
  Need for more research on technologies that will alleviate internal control 
burden faced by small firms 
Arnold et al. (2007) 
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2.4.10 Shareholders and Internal Control Shareholders hold auditor partly responsible if they report account-level 
MW with restatements 
Hermanson et al. (2009) 
  Shareholders lobbied for a stricter implementation of SOX Hochberg et al. (2009) 
  Firms with high agency costs and limited legal repercussions have stronger 
internal control 
Cassar and Garakos 
(2010) 
  Manager profit is positively linked to strong internal control 
  Investors adjust investment risk assessments based on MW pervasiveness 
and disclosure 
Rose et al. (2010) 




! ! !70 
Table 4.1 
Sample Selection and Categorization of Firms with MW 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection+   
  MW Sample (Observations with MW): 
 Total number of Section 404 reports with MW for fiscal years 2004-2009 6,418  
Eliminate duplicates due to financial restatements  (159) 
Eliminate observations arising from reporting MW in non-consecutive years  (488) 
Eliminate observations associated with partial remediation  (1,074) 
Eliminate firm years due to data restrictions imposed by the current study  (3,425) 
Total number of observations identified for use in the current study  1,272  
  Control Sample (Observations with no MW)  
Total number of Section 404 reports without MW for fiscal years 2004-2009  33,175  
Eliminate duplicates due to financial restatements  (540) 
Eliminate observations associated with firms reporting MW in SOX Section 302 
 reports and subsequently reporting clean SOX Section 404 reports  (729) 
Eliminate observations arising from reporting MW in non-consecutive years  (431) 
Eliminate observations associated with partial remediation  (393) 
Eliminate firm years due to data restrictions imposed by the current study  (10,857) 
Total number of control observations identified for use in the current study  20,225  
  Total Sample  21,497  
  Panel B: Categorization of MW++  
  Observations associated with firms reporting MW: 
   Single year  1,002  
Two consecutive years  191  
Three consecutive years  58  
Four or more consecutive years+++  21  
Total MW Observations  1,272  
  Observations associated with firms reporting capital investment specific MW: 
   Single year  330  
Two consecutive years  66  
Three consecutive years  24  
Total Capital Investment Specific MW Observations  420  
 
+ Panel A defines the steps employed to arrive at the final MW and control samples for firms that report on 
their internal control during fiscal years 2004 through 2009. 
 
++ Panel B categorizes firms based on the number of consecutive years in which a firm reports MW. For 
example, if a firm reported MW in the previous two years (observations) and the current year, the reported 
MW for the firm in the current year would classify the observation as a three consecutive year observation. 
This firm’s observation from the previous year would be classified as a two consecutive year observation 
and so on. 
 
+++ As discussed in the text, a limited number of firms had MW in five and six consecutive years. Given the 
limited number of observations available in the final sample, MW beyond four years were not considered 
as separate categories.
!
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Descriptive Statistics 
 





Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.   Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
INVST  20,225  12.57 17.89 
 
 1,272  13.42 19.00 
MKT_CAP  20,225  4240.51 12129.77 
 
 1,272  1565.51 6623.28 
AGE_FIRM  20,225  16.34 15.59 
 
 1,272  13.40 13.02 
LOSS  20,225  0.28 0.45 
 
 1,272  0.47 0.50 
FCR  20,225  0.27 0.44 
 
 1,272  0.31 0.46 
SL_GR  20,225  5.56 2.79 
 
 1,272  5.50 3.08 
M2B  20,225  1.85 1.46 
 
 1,272  1.87 1.49 
CF  20,225  -0.25 2.62 
 
 1,272  -0.38 2.74 
SDCF  20,225  0.06 0.07 
 
 1,272  0.08 0.08 
SDS  20,225  0.13 0.14 
 
 1,272  0.17 0.16 
SDI  20,225  8.08 12.43 
 
 1,272  10.06 13.47 
TNGBTY  20,225  0.22 0.25 
 
 1,272  0.22 0.23 
KSTR  20,225  0.21 0.24 
 
 1,272  0.20 0.24 
MKSTR  20,225  0.21 0.14 
 
 1,272  0.18 0.13 
OPCY  20,225  5.04 1.50 
 
 1,272  4.97 1.33 
DVDS  20,225  0.35 0.48    1,272  0.12 0.32 





Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.   Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
INVST  1,272  13.42 19.00 
 
 1,002  14.47 20.48 
MKT_CAP  1,272  1565.51 6623.28 
 
 1,002  1466.33 5654.06 
AGE_FIRM  1,272  13.40 13.02 
 
 1,002  12.91 13.08 
LOSS  1,272  0.47 0.50 
 
 1,002  0.43 0.49 
FCR  1,272  0.31 0.46 
 
 1,002  0.29 0.45 
SL_GR  1,272  5.50 3.08 
 
 1,002  5.62 3.06 
M2B  1,272  1.87 1.49 
 
 1,002  1.94 1.53 
CF  1,272  -0.38 2.74 
 
 1,002  -0.42 2.92 
SDCF  1,272  0.08 0.08 
 
 1,002  0.08 0.08 
SDS  1,272  0.17 0.16 
 
 1,002  0.17 0.17 
SDI  1,272  10.06 13.47 
 
 1,002  10.01 13.40 
TNGBTY  1,272  0.22 0.23 
 
 1,002  0.21 0.23 
KSTR  1,272  0.20 0.24 
 
 1,002  0.20 0.24 
MKSTR  1,272  0.18 0.13 
 
 1,002  0.17 0.13 
OPCY  1,272  4.97 1.33 
 
 1,002  5.01 1.38 
DVDS  1,272  0.12 0.32    1,002  0.13 0.34 
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.   Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
INVST  1,002  14.47 20.48 
 
 191  12.13 16.83 
MKT_CAP  1,002  1466.33 5654.06 
 
 191  1504.87 7087.28 
AGE_FIRM  1,002  12.91 13.08 
 
 191  13.79 12.27 
LOSS  1,002  0.43 0.49 
 
 191  0.55 0.50 
FCR  1,002  0.29 0.45 
 
 191  0.35 0.48 
SL_GR  1,002  5.62 3.06 
 
 191  5.49 3.11 
M2B  1,002  1.94 1.53 
 
 191  1.75 1.38 
CF  1,002  -0.42 2.92 
 
 191  -0.36 2.58 
SDCF  1,002  0.08 0.08 
 
 191  0.08 0.08 
SDS  1,002  0.17 0.17 
 
 191  0.17 0.16 
SDI  1,002  10.01 13.40 
 
 191  10.51 13.82 
TNGBTY  1,002  0.21 0.23 
 
 191  0.22 0.23 
KSTR  1,002  0.20 0.24 
 
 191  0.21 0.26 
MKSTR  1,002  0.17 0.13 
 
 191  0.18 0.13 
OPCY  1,002  5.01 1.38 
 
 191  4.92 1.22 
DVDS  1,002  0.13 0.34    191  0.09 0.28 





Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.   Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
INVST  191  12.13 16.83 
 
 58  9.85 12.49 
MKT_CAP  191  1504.87 7087.28 
 
 58  2270.03 10209.43 
AGE_FIRM  191  13.79 12.27 
 
 58  15.20 14.37 
LOSS  191  0.55 0.50 
 
 58  0.55 0.50 
FCR  191  0.35 0.48 
 
 58  0.38 0.49 
SL_GR  191  5.49 3.11 
 
 58  4.98 3.14 
M2B  191  1.75 1.38 
 
 58  1.85 1.55 
CF  191  -0.36 2.58 
 
 58  -0.21 1.95 
SDCF  191  0.08 0.08 
 
 58  0.08 0.08 
SDS  191  0.17 0.16 
 
 58  0.18 0.17 
SDI  191  10.51 13.82 
 
 58  10.64 14.62 
TNGBTY  191  0.22 0.23 
 
 58  0.23 0.23 
KSTR  191  0.21 0.26 
 
 58  0.19 0.26 
MKSTR  191  0.18 0.13 
 
 58  0.17 0.12 
OPCY  191  4.92 1.22 
 
 58  4.75 1.17 
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.   Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
INVST  58  9.85 12.49 
 
 21  8.83 9.49 
MKT_CAP  58  2270.03 10209.43 
 
 21  2525.30 10690.96 
AGE_FIRM  58  15.20 14.37 
 
 21  16.97 12.93 
LOSS  58  0.55 0.50 
 
 21  0.55 0.50 
FCR  58  0.38 0.49 
 
 21  0.45 0.50 
SL_GR  58  4.98 3.14 
 
 21  4.31 2.71 
M2B  58  1.85 1.55 
 
 21  1.51 0.80 
CF  58  -0.21 1.95 
 
 21  0.01 0.52 
SDCF  58  0.08 0.08 
 
 21  0.05 0.06 
SDS  58  0.18 0.17 
 
 21  0.13 0.15 
SDI  58  10.64 14.62 
 
 21  6.40 7.76 
TNGBTY  58  0.23 0.23 
 
 21  0.25 0.23 
KSTR  58  0.19 0.26 
 
 21  0.23 0.26 
MKSTR  58  0.17 0.12 
 
 21  0.20 0.13 
OPCY  58  4.75 1.17 
 
 21  4.83 1.30 
DVDS  58  0.08 0.27    21  0.18 0.38 
 
This table displays the descriptive statistics. Panel A compares control group characteristics to MW group 
characteristics. Panel B compares MW group characteristics to MW1 group characteristics. Panel C 
compares MW1 group characteristics to MW2 group characteristics. Panel D compares control MW2 
characteristics to MW3 group characteristics. Panel E compares MW3 group characteristics to MW4 group 
characteristics. The observations from all panels are drawn from the time period of November 2004 
through December 2009. All variables are defined within Appendix A.   
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Relation Between MW and Investment Efficiency 
 
  Underinvestment Overinvestment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables INVSTEFF1 INVSTEFF2 INVSTEFF1 INVSTEFF2 
Intercept -6.28*** -6.24*** 9.47** 7.59* 
 
(1.72) (1.68) (4.46) (4.37) 
MW -0.79*** -0.73*** 1.80*** 1.86** 
 
(0.18) (0.11) (0.62) (0.72) 
MKT_CAP 0.15*** 0.15*** -0.46*** -0.41** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.17) 
AGE_FIRM 0.27*** 0.24* -0.43 -0.63** 
 
(0.10) (0.13) (0.27) (0.25) 
LOSS -0.12 -0.01 0.85 0.93 
 
(0.17) (0.21) (1.12) (0.95) 
FCR -0.26* -0.31*** 0.97*** 0.75** 
 
(0.15) (0.12) (0.30) (0.37) 
SL_GR -0.05* -0.09*** 0.14* 0.19** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) 
M2B 0.20* 0.18 -1.48*** -1.40*** 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.31) (0.29) 
CF 0.22*** -0.02 0.20* 0.09 
 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.14) 
SDCF -2.28** -1.02 0.86 1.17 
 
(1.07) (1.21) (5.22) (5.62) 
SDS -2.37*** -1.99*** -2.89 -2.92 
 
(0.46) (0.44) (2.30) (2.24) 
SDI 0.01 0.00 -0.11*** -0.10*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
TNGBTY -2.63*** -2.57*** 2.08 2.62 
 
(0.82) (0.65) (2.15) (2.20) 
KSTR 1.50*** 1.21*** -2.51* -1.87 
 
(0.37) (0.32) (1.51) (1.37) 
MKSTR -6.19*** -6.20*** -5.44 -5.21* 
 
(1.18) (1.39) (3.53) (3.00) 
OPCY -0.13 -0.06 -0.46 -0.46** 
 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.31) (0.22) 
DVDS -0.33* -0.25* -0.30 -0.50 
 
(0.19) (0.13) (0.74) (0.72) 
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Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,548 14,069 6,949 7,428 
Adj. R-squared 43.80% 37.30% 15.60% 17.30% 
 
Table 5.2 reports results for the following OLS regression: 
 
INVSTEFFii,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MWi,t +!2 *MKT _CAPi,t +!3 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!4 *LOSSi,t +!5 *FCRi,t +!6 *SL _GRi,t
+!7 *M2Bi,t +!8 *CFi,t +!9 *SDCFi,t +!10 *SDSi,t +!11 *SDIi,t +!12 *TNGBTYi,t +!13 *KSTRi,t
+!14 *MKSTRi,t +!15 *OPCYi,t +!16 *DVDSi,t + IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
           (1) 
 
Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Table 5.3 
Relation Between Multiple Consecutive MW and Investment Efficiency 
 
  Underinvestment Overinvestment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES INVSTEFF1 INVSTEFF2 INVSTEFF1 INVSTEFF2 
Intercept -6.01*** -5.95*** 9.30** 7.50* 
 
(1.78) (1.69) (4.51) (4.38) 
MW1 -0.57*** -0.43** 1.27*** 1.22** 
 
(0.22) (0.18) (0.39) (0.49) 
MW2 -1.49** -1.85** 2.96** 3.08* 
 
(0.74) (0.81) (1.50) (1.70) 
MW3 -2.23*** -2.77*** 4.04** 4.51** 
 
(0.63) (0.67) (1.42) (1.86) 
MW4 -5.60** -3.72 5.61** 5.62*** 
 
(2.61) (3.74) (1.73) (1.11) 
MKT_CAP 0.15*** 0.14*** -0.46*** -0.41** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.17) 
AGE_FIRM 0.27*** 0.24* -0.41 -0.62** 
 
(0.10) (0.13) (0.26) (0.25) 
LOSS -0.13 -0.01 0.84 0.93 
 
(0.17) (0.20) (1.13) (0.96) 
FCR 0.28* 0.33*** -0.97*** -0.76** 
 
(0.15) (0.12) (0.30) (0.37) 
SL_GR -0.05* -0.09*** 0.14* 0.19** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.07) 
M2B 0.19* 0.17 1.49*** 1.40*** 
 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.31) (0.29) 
CF 0.22*** -0.02 -0.19* -0.09 
 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.14) 
SDCF 2.73** 1.37 0.22 0.71 
 
(1.08) (1.14) (5.21) (5.53) 
SDS -2.47*** -2.09*** 3.10 3.08 
 
(0.47) (0.44) (2.37) (2.30) 
SDI 0.01 0.00 0.11*** 0.10*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
TNGBTY 2.61*** 2.50*** -2.19 -2.65 
 
(0.85) (0.67) (2.16) (2.20) 
KSTR -1.57*** -1.25*** -2.53* -1.88 
 
(0.39) (0.32) (1.51) (1.38) 
MKSTR 6.25*** 6.26*** -5.47 -5.22* 
 
(1.19) (1.42) (3.55) (3.03) 
OPCY -0.17* -0.10 -0.43 -0.44** 
 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.30) (0.22) 
DVDS -0.32 -0.25* -0.32 -0.53 
 
(0.20) (0.14) (0.73) (0.71) 
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Industry FE Included Included Included Included 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,548 14,069 6,949 7,428 
Adj. R-squared 44.90% 38.40% 16.60% 18.40% 
 
Table 5.3 reports results for the following OLS regression: 
 
INVSTEFFii,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MW1i,t +!2 *MW2i,t +!3 *MW3i,t +!4 *MW 4i,t +!5 *MKT _CAPi,t +!6 *AGE _FIRMi,t
+!7 *LOSSi,t +!8 *FCRi,t +!9 *SL _GRi,t +!10 *M2Bi,t +!11 *CFi,t +!12 *SDCFi,t +!13 *SDSi,t
+!14 *SDIi,t +!15 *TNGBTYi,t +!16 *KSTRi,t +!17 *MKSTRi,t +!18 *OPCYi,t +!19 *DVDSi,t
+IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
    (2) 
 
Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 5.4 
Relation Between Multiple Consecutive MW and Investment Efficiency: Investment Specific MW Compared to All Other 
Types of MW 
 
  Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment 
 
CE MW Other MW CE MW Other MW CE MW Other MW CE MW Other MW 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables INVSTEFF1 INVSTEFF1 INVSTEFF1 INVSTEFF1 INVSTEFF2 INVSTEFF2 INVSTEFF2 INVSTEFF2 
Intercept -0.71* -0.54** 1.49 1.21* -0.61 -0.39** 1.57 1.12 
 
(0.38) (0.22) (1.69) (0.70) (0.47) (0.16) (1.59) (0.86) 
MW1 -3.57*** -0.58 3.42** 2.89 -1.05** -0.39* 2.22*** 1.24* 
 
(0.47) (0.82) (1.55) (1.83) (0.46) (0.24) (0.67) (0.78) 
MW2 -4.94*** -1.44* 4.16** 3.49 -2.44* -1.22* 3.44** 2.15** 
 
(1.69) (0.74) (1.87) (3.88) (1.37) (0.73) (1.48) (1.21) 
MW3 -5.73*** -2.64 4.98*** 3.10 -5.39** -1.17 4.81*** 3.41* 
 
(0.38) (1.72) (1.36) (2.26) (2.43) (2.24) (1.23) (1.98) 
MKT_CAP 0.25** 0.28*** -0.36 -0.42 0.22* 0.25** -0.62** -0.62** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.25) (0.28) (0.12) (0.13) (0.29) (0.26) 
AGE_FIRM 0.14 0.15 -0.81 -0.81 0.04 0.06 -0.87 -0.88 
 
(0.17) (0.18) (1.18) (1.16) (0.20) (0.21) (0.98) (0.98) 
LOSS -0.30** -0.30** 1.00*** 0.93*** -0.35*** -0.34*** 0.74* 0.72** 
 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.37) (0.28) (0.12) (0.12) (0.43) (0.35) 
FCR -0.05* -0.05* 0.12 0.13* -0.08*** -0.09*** 0.17** 0.19** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) 
SL_GR 0.18 0.19* 1.51*** 1.48*** 0.15 0.17 1.43*** 1.39*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.29) (0.30) (0.12) (0.12) (0.28) (0.28) 
M2B 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.15* 0.21** -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.14) 
CF 2.08* 2.68** 0.01 0.10 0.63 1.14 0.54 0.83 
 
(1.24) (1.11) (5.20) (5.40) (1.05) (1.21) (5.75) (5.66) 
SDCF 2.12*** 2.45*** -4.02* -3.16 1.77*** 2.07*** -3.95* -3.04 
 
(0.45) (0.49) (2.17) (2.47) (0.44) (0.44) (2.13) (2.39) 
!
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Table 5.4 – Cont.  
SDS 0.00 0.00 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.00 0.00 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
SDI 2.74*** 2.64*** 2.13 2.27 2.60*** 2.57*** 2.73 2.74 
 
(0.86) (0.88) (2.13) (2.14) (0.67) (0.72) (2.17) (2.13) 
TNGBTY 1.53*** 1.55*** -2.77* -2.66* 1.25*** 1.27*** -2.11 -2.05 
 
(0.39) (0.38) (1.67) (1.53) (0.31) (0.30) (1.43) (1.38) 
KSTR -6.08*** -6.21*** -5.66 -5.41 -6.15*** -6.25*** -5.33* -5.18* 
 
(1.15) (1.20) (3.77) (3.47) (1.39) (1.43) (3.12) (2.96) 
MKSTR 0.14 0.19** -0.47* -0.44 -0.07 -0.11 -0.49** -0.45** 
 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.27) (0.29) (0.09) (0.07) (0.23) (0.22) 
OPCY -0.33 -0.33* -0.25 -0.36 -0.28* -0.26** -0.49 -0.54 
 
(0.22) (0.20) (0.69) (0.74) (0.15) (0.13) (0.70) (0.71) 
DVDS -0.001 0.000 0.004** 0.003* -0.002* -0.001 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industry FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,889 10,273 4,774 4,923 9,565 9,934 5,099 5,264 
Adj. R-squared 45.90% 43.80% 18.00% 15.50% 39.50% 37.40% 19.70% 17.30% 
 
Table 5.4 reports the results for the following OLS regression: 
 
INVSTEFFii,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MW1i,t +!2 *MW2i,t +!3 *MW3i,t +!4 *MW 4i,t +!5 *MKT _CAPi,t +!6 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!7 *LOSSi,t +!8 *FCRi,t +!9 *SL _GRi,t +!10 *M2Bi,t
+!11 *CFi,t +!12 *SDCFi,t +!13 *SDSi,t +!14 *SDIi,t +!15 *TNGBTYi,t +!16 *KSTRi,t +!17 *MKSTRi,t +!18 *OPCYi,t +!19 *DVDSi,t + IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
 (2) 
 
Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, using two-tailed 
tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
!
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Table 5.5 
Summary of Main Results 
 







H1: FRQ issues lead to greater 
investment inefficiency 
INVSTEFFii,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MWi,t +!2 *MKT _CAPi,t
+!3 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!4 *LOSSi,t
+!5 *FCRi,t +!6 *SL _GRi,t +!7 *M2Bi,t
+!8 *CFi,t +!9 *SDCFi,t +!10 *SDSi,t
+!11 *SDIi,t +!12 *TNGBTYi,t +!13 *KSTRi,t
+!14 *MKSTRi,t +!15 *OPCYi,t +!16 *DVDSi,t
+IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
  
✓ Figure 5.1 Table 5.2 
H2: Firms that report FRQ issues in 
multiple consecutive years have a 
higher level of investment inefficiency 
INVSTEFFii,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MW1i,t +!2 *MW2i,t +!3 *MW3i,t
+!4 *MW 4i,t +!5 *MKT _CAPi,t
+!6 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!7 *LOSSi,t
+!8 *FCRi,t +!9 *SL _GRi,t +!10 *M2Bi,t
+!11 *CFi,t +!12 *SDCFi,t +!13 *SDSi,t
+!14 *SDIi,t +!15 *TNGBTYi,t +!16 *KSTRi,t
+!17 *MKSTRi,t +!18 *OPCYi,t +!19 *DVDSi,t
+IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
  
✓ Figure 5.1 Table 5.3 
H3: Investment inefficiency increases as 
firms continue to report FRQ issues ✓ Figure 5.1 Table 5.3 
H4: Investment-specific FRQ issues 
have a greater impact on investment 
efficiency than non-investment-specific 
FRQ issues 
✓  Table 5.4 
 
!
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Table 5.6 




to normal investment 
Overinvestment compared 
to normal investment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
AQ -2.54** (0.99) -2.45** (1.23) 
INSTIT -0.24** (0.10) 0.11 (0.10) 
ANLYT -0.01** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
IG_SCORE -0.01 (0.02) -0.04** (0.02) 
DG_SCORE 0.07 (0.16) -0.32** (0.15) 
LGASST -0.05** (0.02) -0.10*** (0.02) 
M2B -0.13*** (0.03) 0.20*** (0.03) 
SDCF -2.74*** (0.69) -0.72 (0.60) 
SDS 0.91*** (0.25) 0.40* (0.24) 
SDI 0.00 (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 
Z_SC 0.02 (0.05) -0.16*** (0.06) 
TNGBTY -1.61*** (0.21) 1.19*** (0.19) 
KSTR 1.12*** (0.18) -1.76*** (0.19) 
MKSTR -2.90*** (0.40) -0.10 (0.35) 
CF 0.06*** (0.02) -0.04** (0.02) 
SLACK 0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) 
DVDS 0.12 (0.07) -0.26*** (0.06) 
FIRM_AGE 0.01** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) 
OPCY -0.08 (0.05) -0.22*** (0.04) 
LOSS 0.14** (0.07) -0.04 (0.06) 
     
     Industry FE Included 
 
Included 
 Year Fixed Effects Included 
 
Included 
 Firm Cluster Yes 
 
Yes 
 Observations 21,459 
 
21,459 
 Pseudo R-Sq 13.96%   13.96%   
 
Table 5.6 reports the results for the following multinomial logistic regression: 
 
INVSTQi,t+1 = !0 +!1 *AQi,t +!2 * INSTITi,t +!3 *ANLYTi,t +!4 * IG _ SCOREi,t +!5 *DG _ SCOREi,t +!6 *LGASSTi,t
+!7 *M2Bi,t +!8 *SDCFi,t +!9 *SDSi,t +!10 *SDIi,t +!11 *Z _ SCi,t +!12 *TNGBTYi,t +!13 *KSTRi,t




Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 5.7 
Cheng et al. (2011) Replication 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Intercept 11.05*** (3.45) 8.47*** (2.67) 







IE -1.35 (7.73) -2.88** (1.23) 







INSTIT 5.43*** (1.47) 7.05*** (2.25) 
ANLYT -0.17** (0.08) 0.16 (0.11) 
G_SCORE -1.06* (0.64) -0.24 (0.16) 
DG_SCORE 1.79** (0.81) 1.83** (0.82) 
DG_SCORE*IE -5.70** (2.77) -3.70 (2.77) 
AQ 26.79* (15.18) 14.06 (10.69) 
AQ*IE -31.75** (14.65) -17.62 (13.72) 
INSTIT*IE -6.67*** (2.07) -7.76* (4.32) 
ANLYT*IE 0.21* (0.12) -0.24 (0.15) 
G_SCORE*IE 1.75* (0.97) 0.48* (0.25) 
MB 0.03 (0.08) -0.02 (0.10) 
LGASST -0.48*** (0.17) -0.42*** (0.16) 
SDCF 19.61** (8.84) 28.39*** (4.53) 
SDS -4.50* (2.38) -1.74 (2.53) 
SDI 0.07 (0.05) 0.04 (0.03) 
Z_SC -1.11*** (0.25) -1.60*** (0.23) 
TNGBTY 7.54*** (2.45) 6.90*** (0.99) 
KSTR -0.49 (2.30) -1.95 (1.29) 
MKSTR -18.64*** (3.89) -10.24** (5.10) 
CF -1.25 (2.23) -7.17* (4.10) 
DVDS -0.61 (0.46) -0.52 (0.54) 
OPCY -1.34*** (0.34) -0.44 (0.28) 
LOSS -2.58*** (0.53) 0.22 (0.78) 
M2B 1.61*** (0.25) 1.70*** (0.42) 
REST 3.63 (4.81) 2.62 (2.90) 
FCR -0.37 (0.51) -0.51 (0.52) 
SL_GR 6.73*** (1.16) 8.00*** (0.65) 
AGE_FIRM -1.00*** (0.27) -0.04*** (0.01) 












Adj. R-squared 31.90%  
!
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Table 5.7 Cont. 
Columns 1 and 2 report results for the following OLS regression: 
INVSTi,t = !0 +!1 *MWFIRMi,t!1 +!2 *MWFIRMi,t!1 * IEi,t + "i *MWFIRMDeti,t!1" + # i * INVDeti,t!1 +"
+ $i *GOVi,t!1 +" $i *GOVi,t!1 * IEi,t"
          (6) 
Columns 3 and 4 report results for the following OLS regression: 
INVSTi = !0 +!1 *MWFIRMi,t!1 +!2 *MWFIRMi,t!1 * IEi,t +!3 *MWFIRMi,t+1 +!4 *MWFIRMi,t+1 * IEi,t+2
+!5 *MWFIRMi,t+2 +!6 *MWFIRMi,t+2 * IEi,t+3 + "i *MWFIRMDeti" + # i * INVDeti"
+ $i *GOVi +" $i *GOVi * IEi"
         (7) 
Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 5.8 
Conditional Relation Between Multiple Consecutive Years of MW and Investment 
Efficiency 
 
    (1) (2) 
  
INVST 




MW1 (1) Underinvestment -2.52* (1.43) 
MW2 (2) Underinvestment -5.06* (3.02) 
MW3 (3) Underinvestment -7.53*** (1.50) 
















(1) + (5) Overinvestment p=0.02** 
 (2) + (6) Overinvestment p=0.07* 
 (3) + (7) Overinvestment p=0.03** 














































    Industry FE 
 
Included 
 Firm Cluster 
 
Yes 






 R-squared  30.30%   
Table 5.8 reports the OLS regression results for the following equation 
INVSTi,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MW1i,t +!2 *MW2i,t +!3 *MW3i,t +!4 *MW 4i,t +!5 * IEi,t+1 +!6 *MW1i,t * IEi,t+1
+!7 *MW2i,t * IEi,t+1 +!8 *MW3i,t * IEi,t+1 +!9 *MW 4i,t * IEi,t+1 +!10 *MKT _CAPi,t +!11 *AGE _FIRMi,t
+!12 *LOSSi,t +!13 *FCRi,t +!14 *SL _GRi,t +!15 *M2Bi,t +!16 *CFi,t +!17 *SDCFi,t +!18 *SDSi,t
+!19 *SDIi,t +!20 *TNGBTYi,t +!21 *KSTRi,t +!22 *MKSTRi,t +!23 *OPCYi,t +!24 *DVDSi,t
+IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
     (8) 
Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Table 5.9 
Relation Between Multiple Consecutive MW and Change in Investment Efficiency 
 
  Underinvestment Overinvestment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES !INVSTEFF1 !INVSTEFF2 !INVSTEFF1 !INVSTEFF2 
Constant -3.11 -3.58 9.98*** 5.58*** 
 
(2.21) (2.30) (3.30) (1.42) 
MW1 -1.39** -1.44** 1.30* 1.27* 
 
(0.65) (0.71) (0.74) 0.69  
MW2 -1.80** -2.10** 1.27* 1.24* 
 
(0.86) (0.91) (0.73) (0.71) 
MW3 -2.80* -2.67* 1.56** 1.79** 
 
(1.62) (1.39) (0.73) (0.74) 
MW4 -1.58*** -3.09 2.63*** 2.57 
 
(0.47) (3.61) (0.81) (2.67) 
MKT_CAP 0.09 0.11 -0.21* -0.12 
 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) 
AGE_FIRM 0.18 0.19 0.08 0.06 
 
(0.19) (0.22) (0.29) (0.29) 
LOSS -0.45* -0.44 0.39*** 0.32*** 
 
(0.24) (0.32) (0.07) (0.07) 
FCR 0.89** 0.92** -0.12 -0.17 
 
(0.36) (0.43) (0.34) (0.28) 
SL_GR -0.73*** -0.71*** -0.57*** -0.49*** 
 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) 
M2B 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.10 
 
(0.21) (0.24) (0.19) (0.21) 
CF 0.18 0.28 0.05 -0.02 
 
(0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.12) 
SDCF -1.66*** -1.19*** -2.54*** -2.71*** 
 
(0.21) (0.25) (0.64) (0.67) 
SDS 1.26 0.452 3.47 5.328* 
 
(0.98) (1.08) (3.01) (2.84) 
SDI -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.05 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
TNGBTY -2.13 -2.83* -9.05*** -7.45** 
 
(1.63) (1.54) (3.44) (3.24) 
KSTR -5.78*** -5.86*** -2.98 -2.26 
 
(1.96) (2.16) (2.20) (1.64) 
MKSTR 7.46*** 8.16*** -6.99** -6.58*** 
 
(1.92) (2.89) (3.16) (2.48) 
OPCY -0.47** -0.53*** -0.27 0.03 
 
(0.20) (0.17) (0.32) (0.34) 
DVDS 0.70*** 0.68*** 0.80 0.36 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.51) (0.42) 
     
!
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Table 5.9 Cont. 
 
Industry FE Included Included Included Included 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,732 13,425 6,115 6,422 
Adj. R-squared 17.60% 17.00% 12.70% 12.60% 
 
Table 5.9 reports the results for the following OLS regression: 
 
!INVSTEFFii,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MW1i,t +!2 *MW2i,t +!3 *MW3i,t +!4 *MW 4i,t +!5 *MKT _CAPi,t +!6 *AGE _FIRMi,t
+!7 *LOSSi,t +!8 *FCRi,t +!9 *SL _GRi,t +!10 *M2Bi,t +!11 *CFi,t +!12 *SDCFi,t +!13 *SDSi,t




Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Table 5.10 
Relation Between Multiple Consecutive MW and Investment Efficiency with 
Additional Control Variables 
 
  Underinvestment Overinvestment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES INVSTEFF1 INVSTEFF2 INVSTEFF1 INVSTEFF2 
Intercept -4.10** -5.37*** 8.66*** 7.15*** 
 
(2.05) (1.79) (2.32) (2.30) 
MW1 -0.88*** -0.78** 1.96** 1.38** 
 
(0.32) (0.31) (0.79) (0.70) 
MW2 -1.26 -1.47** 2.80** 3.17*** 
 
(0.81) (0.65) (1.35) (1.03) 
MW3 -2.39*** -2.71*** 3.90 4.03* 
 
(0.52) (0.51) (3.28) (2.56) 
MW4 -2.74*** -3.14*** 5.15** 5.51* 
 
(0.52) (0.42) (2.02) (3.13) 
AQ 3.181* 2.674* 2.02* 3.12* 
 
(1.59) (1.46) (1.14) (1.84) 
ISTIT -0.43 -0.33 3.63** 3.64** 
 
(0.31) (0.35) (1.55) (1.79) 
ANLYT 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.10 -0.06 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) 
IG_SCORE 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.10 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.13) 
DG_SCORE -0.53 -0.24 -0.03 0.18 
 
(0.46) (0.43) (1.45) (1.36) 
MKT_CAP 0.12** 0.11* -0.20 -0.27 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.23) (0.26) 
AGE_FIRM 0.18 0.16 -0.46 -0.59 
 
(0.12) (0.14) (0.65) (0.55) 
LOSS -0.42* -0.23 1.14 1.43 
 
(0.23) (0.25) (1.48) (1.18) 
FCR 0.19 0.33 -1.47** -1.25* 
 
(0.17) (0.20) (0.62) (0.65) 
SL_GR -0.07** -0.13*** 0.22 0.22* 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.13) 
M2B 0.29* 0.23 1.16*** 1.12*** 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.37) (0.33) 
CF -0.15* 0.12 -0.42** -0.37** 
 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.20) (0.16) 
SDCF 4.68** 2.61* 1.45 2.94 
 
(2.10) (1.34) (4.89) (7.04) 
SDS -2.46*** -1.91*** 4.34 3.48 
 
(0.55) (0.54) (2.78) (3.31) 
    
!
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(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
TNGBTY 2.84*** 2.67*** 3.32 3.62 
 
(1.04) (0.77) (2.77) (2.93) 
KSTR -2.47*** -2.12*** -5.68*** -5.09*** 
 
(0.50) (0.47) (1.56) (1.37) 
MKSTR 7.87*** 8.29*** -13.32*** -11.95** 
 
(1.78) (1.73) (4.68) (4.94) 
OPCY -0.24* -0.15 -0.51 -0.57* 
 
(0.13) (0.11) (0.41) (0.33) 
DVDS -0.39 -0.32 0.19 0.10 
 
(0.27) (0.20) (1.08) (1.15) 
SLACK 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
     Industry FE Included Included Included Included 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,414 14,013 6,965 7,366 
Adj. R-squared 37.70% 32.20% 15.00% 15.70% 
 
Table 5.10 reports the results for the following OLS regression: 
 
INVSTEFFii,t+1 = !0 +!1 *MW1i,t +!2 *MW2i,t +!3 *MW3i,t +!4 *MW 4i,t +!5 *AQi,t +!6 * INSTITi,t
+!7 *ANLYTi,t +!8 * IG _ SCOREi,t +!9 *DG _ SCOREi,t +!10 *MKT _CAPi,t
+!11 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!12 *LOSSi,t +!13 *FCRi,t +!14 *SL _GRi,t +!15 *M2Bi,t +!16 *CFi,t
+!17 *SDCFi,t +!18 *SDSi,t +!19 *SDIi,t +!20 *TNGBTYi,t +!21 *KSTRi,t +!22 *MKSTRi,t
+!23 *OPCYi,t +!24 *DVDSi,t + IndustryFixedEffects+"i,t
(9) 
 
Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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+SOX 302 Requirements 
• Quarterly and annual certification by the CEO and CFO that must contain: 
o Statements that officers are responsible for firm’s internal control 
o Statements that officers have evaluated the internal control systems 
o Disclosure of any material weaknesses in internal control (MW) 
• Disclosure of significant deficiencies in internal control to the audit committee, board, and 
company auditors 
 
++SOX 404(a) Requirements 
 
• Assessment of internal control system by firm’s management that must contain: 
o Statements that management is responsible for establishing and maintaining the internal 
control system 
o An assessment on the effectiveness of the internal control system 
o  
+++SOX 404(b) Requirements 
 
• Firm’s external auditors will attest to and report on management’s assessment of internal control. 
 
++++Filers with the SEC can be categorized as either accelerated or non-accelerated filers. An accelerated 
filer is defined by the SEC as: “ (1) the issuer had an aggregate market value of voting and non- voting 
common equity held by non-affiliates of the issuer of $75 million or more, as of the last business day of the 
issuer’s most recently completed second fiscal quarter; (2) the issuer had been subject to the reporting 
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)] for a period of at 
least 12 calendar months; (3) the issuer previously had filed at least one annual report; and (4) the issuer 
was not eligible to use Forms 10-KSB and 10-QSB [17 CFR 249.310b and 17 CFR 249.308b] for its annual 
and quarterly reports” (SEC 2005) 
Sox enacted 
July 30, 2002 
Section 404(a)++ & (b)+++ compliance 
required on all annual reports of 
accelerated++++ filers for fiscal year ending 
on or after November 15, 2004. 
Frank-Dodd Act 
passed July 21, 2010 
releasing non-
accelerated filers from 
Section 404(b)+++ 
compliance 
Section 404(a)++ compliance required 
on all annual reports of non-accelerated 
filers for fiscal years ending on or after 
December 15, 2007 
Section 302+ 
required for all 
quarters ending after 
August 29, 2002 
!
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Figure 5.1 
Comparison of Investment Residuals Across MW Categories 
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Appendix A 




INVST  = The sum of acquisition expenditures, capital investment expenditures and  
research and development expenditures minus sales of property, plant 
and equipment. This value is then multiplied by 100 and then scaled by 
the lagged value of total assets. 
 
INVSTEFF1 = Residual of INVST=!0 + !1*SaleGr + ", where INVST is measured in  
year t+1, SaleGr is measured as the percentage change in sales from year 
t-1 to t. This equation is estimated for each industry year based on the 
Fama and French 48 industry classification for all industries with at least 
10 observations in each given year. 
 
INVSTEFF2 = Residual of INVST=!0 + !1*NEG+ !2*SaleGr +!3*NEG*SaleGr +",  
where INVST is measured in year t+1, NEG is an indicator variable that 
is assigned a value of one for negative sales growth and zero otherwise, 
SaleGr is measured as the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to t. 
This equation is estimated for each industry year based on the Fama and 
French 48 industry classification for all industries with at least 10 
observations in each given year. 
 
Key Independent Variables: 
 
MW1  = If the observation represents MW reported for the first time (no previous  
MW reported), it is assigned an indicator variable of 1, zero otherwise. 
 
MW2  = If the observation represents MW reported in a second consecutive year,  
it is assigned an indicator variable of 1, zero otherwise. 
 
MW3  = If the observation represents MW reported in a third consecutive year, it  
is assigned an indicator variable of 1, zero otherwise. 
 
MW4  = If the observation represents MW reported in four or more consecutive  
years, it is assigned an indicator variable of 1, zero otherwise. 
 
MW Control Variables: 
 
MKT_CAP = The logarithm of each firm’s market capitalization. 
 
AGE_FIRM = The logarithm of the number of years the firm has reported within the  
CRSP database. 
 
LOSS  = Sum of earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat Data item IB) in  
years t and (t-1).  If this sum totals less than zero, the firm is assigned an 
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FCR  = If the firm has a non-zero value associated with the foreign currency  
translation (Compustat data item FCA item, the observation is assigned 
an indicator variable of 1, zero otherwise. 
 
SL_GR  = Decile ranking of the year over year sales (Compustat data item SALE)  
growth for years t-2 through t. 
 
Investment Control Variables: 
 
M2B  = Total assets plus market value of common stock minus book value of  
equity minus deferred taxes divided by total assets. 
 
CF  = Cash flow from operating activities divided by sales. 
 
SDCF  = Standard deviation of cash flows scaled by average total assets for the  
time period of t-5 through t-1. 
 
SDS  = Standard deviation of sales scaled by average total assets for the time  
   period of t-5 through t-1. 
 
SDI  = Standard deviation of investment for the time period of t-5 through t-1. 
TNGBTY = Property, plant and equipment divided by average total assets. 
 
KSTR  = Long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market  
   value of common stock. 
 
MKSTR  = Average KSTR of firms within the same 3-digit SIC industry. 
 
OPCY  = Log of receivables divided by sales plus inventory divided by cost of  
   goods sold, multiplied by 360. 
 
DVDS  = Indicator variable set equal to one if dividends are paid, zero otherwise. 
 
Variables Used In Additional Analyses: 
 
AQ  = Standard deviation of company-level residuals from the McNichols  
(2002) modification of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model during the 
years of t-5 through t-1, multiplied by a negative one. I estimate the 
model cross-sectionally for each industry with at least 10 observations in 
a given year based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry 
classification. 
 
INSTIT  = Percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors. 
 
ANLYT  = Number of analysts following the firm as provided by IBES. 
 
IG_SCORE = Gompers et al. (2003) measure of governance, multiplied by a negative  
   one. 
 
G_SCORE = Gompers et al. (2003) measure of governance. 
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DG_SCORE = Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the G_SCORE is missing,  
   and zero otherwise. 
 
LGASST = Log of total assets. 
 
Z_SC  = Measured as the bankruptcy index developed by Altman (1968). 
 
IE  = Ranked variable based on the average of the decile ranked measures of  
cash and leverage. Leverage is multiplied by negative one before ranking 
so that both variables are increasing in the likelihood of over-
investments. This measure is then normalized to a value of between 0 
and 1. 
 
MB  = Ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. 
 
REST  = Aggregate restructuring charges in year t and year t-1, scaled by the  
   firm's market capitalization. 
!
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 Firm specific internal control information has recently been collected and is now 
available as a result of the passage of SOX.  However, a suitable metric to measure an 
organization’s internal control has not yet been developed. The absence of an internal 
control metric is in part due to the differing internal control system priorities of the 
various stakeholders (e.g. managers, auditors, analysts). Recent internal control research 
and guidance recognizes that differences in severity among the types of MW that are 
reported exist. For example, Doyle et al. (2007a, 2007b) find that firms reporting entity-
level MW suffer from lower accruals quality, are smaller, younger, and have lower 
financial stability than firms that report account specific MW. However, research moved 
beyond the dual categorization employed by Doyle et al. (2007a, 2007b) and the 
examination of the impact of different MW types individually (Feng et al. 2010; Li et al. 
2012; Gordon and Wilford 2012). 
This study seeks to provide insight into a potential method for ranking firms 
based on the categorization of MW that is provided through the Audit Analytics 
database.16 The Audit Analytics categorization of MW has been used extensively to 
examine the effects of MW on decisions and firm performance. However, an extensive 
evaluation and ranking of firms based on the specific types of reported MW has not yet 
been conducted.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"#!Audit Analytics is an information service provider that compiles SOX Section 302 and SOX Section 404 
internal control information by firm. 
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The major objectives of this study are (1) to provide insight into stakeholder 
perceptions of specific categories of MW and (2) to provide guidance to decision makers 
as they work toward implementing strong internal control systems within their respective 
organizations. Additionally, the implications of this study may help policy makers as they 
evaluate how to appropriately implement policies that will improve the overall internal 
control environment within firms. The underlying methodology to be used in this study is 
the Analytic Hierarchy Process (hereafter, AHP). 
B.2 The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
AHP, developed by Thomas L. Saaty in the 1970s (Saaty 1980, 1986), combines 
different methods from mathematics and psychology to aid in complex multiple criteria 
decision-making. More specifically, AHP is a tool that can be used to rank alternatives 
based on determining the appropriate weights to assign to the qualitative and quantitative 
criteria and sub-criteria defined within the problem under consideration.  
The four major steps in the AHP are the following: 
• Step 1: Establish the hierarchy by drawing the AHP tree. 
• Step 2: Have participants evaluate the criteria and sub-criteria in the AHP 
tree hierarchy using pairwise comparisons. 
• Step 3: Evaluate participant responses using pairwise comparison matrices 
generated in Step 2. 
• Step 4:  Synthesize the results with respect to the overall goal.  
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B.2.1 Step 1: Establish the Hierarchy 
Establishing the hierarchy in Step 1 begins with defining the overall goal of the 
problem, determining the primary criteria to be considered within the decision making 
process, further refining the primary criteria into sub-criteria, sub-sub-criteria, etc. and 
drawing the AHP tree. In the AHP tree, the primary criteria are connected to the goal 
node, the sub-criteria are connected to the corresponding criteria, etc. Examples of AHP 
trees are given throughout this Appendix. 
An AHP model needs to capture all of the important criteria and sub-criteria, but 
remain small enough that it can be manageable. The two versions of AHP model analysis 
are the Direct Comparison Model (described in Section B.2.1a) and the Ratings Model 
(described in Section B.2.1b).  The process for analyzing a problem is a function of 
which version of the AHP model is used. 
B.2.1.1 The Direct Comparison AHP Model 
Within the Direct Comparison AHP model, the criteria and sub-criteria are 
established and linked to the alternatives that are investigated within the decision making 
process.  A simple example of the AHP tree for the Direct Comparison Model is shown 
as Figure B1 on page 115. The primary result of the Direct Comparison Model is a 
ranking of the alternatives from best to worst by determining the weight between 0 and 1 
to assign to each of the alternatives where the sum of the weights over all of the 
alternatives must equal 1.  For example, a solution to the problem represented by the 
AHP tree in Figure B1 (page 115) may have a weight of 0.60 assigned to Alternative 1 
and a weight of 0.40 assigned to Alternative 2. Thus, Alternative 1 would be considered 
superior within this analysis. 
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B.2.1.2 The Ratings AHP Model  
A second version of the AHP is the Ratings Model. In this case, the sub-criteria 
weights can be replaced by a measure called intensities.  The AHP tree for the Ratings 
Model is displayed in Figure B2a on page 116. Figure B2b, page 116, outlines the AHP 
tree in spreadsheet form for ease of calculation in deciding between alternatives.  With 
the spreadsheet form, the alternatives are placed into a spreadsheet and scored based on 
the weights found for the criteria and sub-criteria (or intensities) using the pairwise 
comparisons.  The alternatives are sorted from best to worst by the overall score found in 
the spreadsheet.  This overall score denotes how close each alternative is to perfection 
where perfection is an overall score of 1.  The Ratings Model is used in the analysis that 
follows. 
B.2.2 Step 2: Have Participants Evaluate Hierarchy Elements Using Pairwise  
 Comparisons 
 
As alluded to previously in this Appendix, the pairwise comparisons are a key 
component of the AHP and are used to supply the data for carrying out the analysis.  The 
pairwise comparisons allow participants to compare the relative importance of criteria 
and sub-criteria two at a time rather than all at once. Comparing all criteria or sub-criteria 
at the same time can be a nearly insurmountable task because of the complexity of the 
decisions.  
A pairwise comparison analysis can be handled in a non-complex setting (Saaty 
1980). Participants use a top-down approach to compare criteria. Within each pairwise 
comparison, participants assign a numerical value, based on a 1 to 9 scale, as their 
evaluation of the more important criterion/sub-criterion to the less important 
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criterion/sub-criterion (Saaty 1980). A chart representing the ratings scale used within 
AHP analysis is provided in Figure B3 on page 117.  
The pairwise comparisons represent a ratio of the weights assigned to the two 
criteria that are being compared. For example, if Criterion A is moderately more 
preferred than Criterion B, then, according to the pairwise comparison scale (in Figure 
B3), the participant assigns a value of 3 when comparing Criterion A to Criterion B and a 
value of 1/3 when comparing Criterion B to Criterion A.  More generally, if the pairwise 
comparison for A to B is equal to w, then the pairwise comparison of B to A = 1/w.   
B.2.3 Step 3: Evaluate the Participant Responses Using the Pairwise Comparison  
 Matrices Generated in Step 2 
 
In Step 3, the participant responses are evaluated to determine the weights 
assigned to the various criteria and sub-criteria. To determine these weights, all pairwise 
comparisons (i.e., judgments) made by the participants in Step 2 are stored in pairwise 
comparison matrices. As noted in Step 2, the pairwise comparison matrix A = (aij) is a 
positive reciprocal matrix (i.e. in the pairwise comparison matrix, aji = 1/aij). Thus, the 
comparison of Criterion i to Criterion j will always be the reciprocal of the comparison of 
Criterion j to Criterion i. These pairwise comparison matrices are then used to determine 
the weights assigned to each criterion and sub-criterion. Then, the eigenvector associated 
with the maximum eigenvalue of a pairwise comparison matrix determines the weights 
assigned to the criteria or sub-criteria associated with the pairwise comparison matrix. 
B.2.4 Step 4:  Synthesize the Results with Respect to the Overall Goal.  
Synthesizing the results for the Direct Comparison AHP Model is different than 
synthesizing the results for the Ratings Model. These two processes are discussed in 
Sections B.2.4a and B.2.4b. 
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B.2.4.1 Synthesizing the Results for the Direct Comparison Model 
The fourth and final step in the Direct Comparison AHP is to determine the total 
weight to be assigned to each alternative. For the purpose of this example, I have 
assigned weights to the criteria and sub-criteria from Figure B1 to produce Figure B4a, 
page 118. These weights, along with a symbol representing each criterion and sub-
criterion are given within each block in Figure B4a.  
The sum of criteria weights must equal one, the sum of the sub-criteria weights 
below each criterion must also be equal to one, and the sum of the alternative weights for 
each sub-criterion must equal 1. Then, to synthesize the results within the Direct 
Comparison AHP, the paths from each goal down to the alternatives are traced, the 
weights are multiplied along each path and these quantities are added together. This 
process leads to the final result illustrated in Figure B4b. Since Alternative 1 yields a 
higher value Alternative 1 (Alt1) is preferred to Alternative 2 (Alt 2). The evaluation of 
Alt1 is 0.525 and the evaluation of Alt2 is 0.475. These computations are shown in 
Figure B4b, page 118. 
B.2.4.2 Synthesizing the Results for the Ratings Model 
As discussed above, the Ratings AHP model differs from the Direct Comparison 
Model in that alternatives are scored based on the intensities and the rating of the sub-
criteria. For the purpose of this example, I have assigned values to the criteria and sub-
criteria from Figure B2 to produce Figure B5, page 119. The sum of criteria values must 
equal one and the sum of the sub-criteria values below each criterion must be equal to 
one.  
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For our current example, I will assume that each alternative either has the listed 
sub-criterion, or does not. As such, Alternative 1 is assigned a value of 0 or 1 for each of 
the sub-criteria it possesses. This evaluation technique mirrors the way the Audit 
Analytics database is constructed, a 0 indicates the MW is not present and a 1 indicates 
the MW is present. Tracing the paths from each goal down to the alternatives, 
multiplying the weights along the paths and subsequently adding the weights together 
leads to the final result (as shown below in Figure B5). Thus, if a higher score is 
equivalent to the better alternative, Alternative 1 would be selected. As stated earlier the 
score for any alternative is no greater than one. 
B.3 Motivation 
 
B.3.1  The Use of AHP in Accounting Research 
 
 AHP has been used within accounting research as a tool to examine evaluation 
and planning decisions. Using AHP to model auditing procedure preferences, Arrington 
et al. (1984) provided one of the first applications of AHP within accounting research. 
Additionally, Arrington et al. (1984) suggest AHP as an applicable procedure for making 
“judgments such as materiality, internal control evaluation, opinion qualifications, and 
strategic planning” (Arrington et al. 1984, 309). Other applications of the AHP in 
accounting include examining auditors’ evaluations of internal audit functions (Messier 
and Schneider, 1988; Campbell, 1994), tests of controls (Spires 1991), audit planning 
(Bedard et al. 1991), performance evaluation (Emby and Etherington 1996), accounting 






! ! !102 
B.3.2 Categorization of MW Within Prior Literature 
 
Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), firm management 
is required to state responsibility for and provide an assessment of internal control. 
Subsequently, a firm’s auditors are required to attest to and report on management’s 
assessment (US House of Representatives 2002) of internal control. The SEC, PCAOB, 
and various private and investor service companies have produced guidance and rulings 
in response to SOX (SEC 2003, PCAOB 2007, Doss and Jonas 2004). This renewed 
focus on internal control came in response to what was perceived to be a lack of internal 
controls within the scandal-ridden companies of the early 2000s (e.g., Enron, TYCO, 
WorldCom, etc.).  With the renewed focus and availability of information provided 
through SOX, researchers have used MW as a backdrop to examine issues affecting the 
firm, auditors, and investors (e.g. Doyle et al. 2007a, Beneish et al. 2008, Early et al. 
2008, Wolfe et al. 2009, Rose et al. 2010). 
Prior research has generally examined internal control based on a two-category 
classification, entity-level controls and account-specific controls. Entity-level controls are 
company-level controls that encompass the control environment and the financial 
reporting process. Account-specific controls are controls over specific financial statement 
accounts and are clearly related to transaction-level processes.  
Entity-level controls can range from controls related to the control environment to 
management tone and external communication and may be more difficult to attach to the 
financial reporting process. Account-specific controls, on the other hand, are clearly 
related to financial reporting (e.g. inadequate processes related to accounting for foreign 
transaction adjustments, lack of reconciliation processes, etc.). The distinct differences 
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between these two categories of internal control have been recognized over the past three 
decades (Kinney 1989; Messier and Austen 2000; PCAOB 2007).  Because of the 
difficulty auditing around entity-level controls, the PCAOB and Moody’s Investors 
Services have both emphasized the importance of understanding controls within this 
category (PCAOB 2007; Doss and Jonas 2004).   
Researchers have recognized the importance of the categorization of internal 
control and have included designations of account-specific and entity-level controls 
within their research in examining the effects of poor internal control upon firm 
characteristics (Ge and McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007a), firm performance (Beneish et 
al. 2008; Gordon and Wilford 2012), earnings quality (Doyle et al. 2007b and Chan et al. 
2008) audit fees (Elder 2009), audit delay (Ettredge 2006), and investor risk adjustment 
(Rose et al. 2010). Since field auditors are the first-line decision makers in the initial 
internal control assessment, they play a crucial role in the Section 404 assessment 
process.  Research has shown a more significant negative effect on cost of equity is 
associated with reporting entity-level MW (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009) and the higher 
the number of MW reported the higher the cost of equity (Gordon and Wilford 2012). 
Additionally, investors increase their investment risk assessments to a greater degree 
when entity-level MW are reported versus account-specific MW (Rose et al. 2010).  
Although auditor attestation is a significant component of SOX Section 404 and 
audited financial statements in general, it is unclear whether a difference in auditor 
perception exists between entity-level MW and account-specific MW.  Research has 
shown that firms report fewer entity-level MW than account-specific MW (Doyle et al. 
2007a; Beneish et al. 2008).  The PCAOB has issued Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) and 
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this standard stipulates a top-down approach, based upon first examining a firm’s entity-
level controls and then moving down to an examination of the process-level (account-
specific) controls, should be used in the integrated audit of financial statements and 
internal control. This approach is based upon an understanding of the difficulty in 
auditing around MW in entity-level controls, based on their pervasive nature, and is 
recognized by both the PCAOB and industry (PCAOB 2007, Doss and Jonas 2004). 
B.4 Overview of Model Using AHP to Examine Internal Control Systems 
 To date, AHP has not as yet been applied as a tool for evaluating various types of 
weaknesses in internal control systems. Prior to the passage of SOX, firm specific 
internal control information was not publicly available. However, firms with MW are 
now required to list their MW within their quarterly and annual reports. This requirement 
has allowed companies to gather this information into a database format that can be 
accessed by practitioners and researchers alike. As a database provider, Audit Analytics 
has classified the MW reported by firms into different categories.  
The current study will seek to establish a metric of internal control strength 
among firms that have reported MW. To test the robustness of the developed metric to 
prior results, I will examine how the AHP developed internal control system metric 
relates to firm performance.  In Section B.5, I describe the AHP Model Design for the 
analysis in this dissertation. 
B.5 AHP Model Design 
 
In this section, I describe the AHP model design for the subsequent analyses that I 
will perform. The goal of this analysis is to develop a metric for determining or 
measuring the internal control system strength of an organization.   
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B.5.1 Establishing the Hierarchy 
  
 Audit Analytics classifies each firm’s reported MW into twenty-one categories. If 
each of these categories of MW were classified as a primary criterion, decision makers 
would analyze (21*20)/2 = 210 pairwise comparisons. To ease this difficulty, the twenty-
one categories of MW are broken down into five major criteria areas where each of the 
twenty-one MW is categorized into each of these five major criteria areas. The five major 
criteria established are the following: 
• Personnel Weaknesses. 
• Financing/Accounting Reporting Issues. 
• Policy Issues. 
• Restatements/Adjustments. 
• Regulatory Issues.  
A diagram of the hierarchy (or AHP tree) for the model I am developing is given 
in Figure B6, page 120. This initial hierarchy has been presented to two accounting 
professionals and the review of the structure yielded no significant modifications to the 
hierarchy. In this AHP tree, there are abbreviations representing each of the five criteria 
and twenty-one sub-criteria. The abbreviations are used to more easily present the results. 
B.5.2 Pairwise Comparison Matrices 
Given that there are five criteria and each of these criteria is composed of 
different sub-criteria, there are six pairwise comparison matrices. The six pairwise 
comparison matrices that each decision maker must fill in according to the pairwise 
comparisons of the different criteria and sub-criteria are based on the five criteria. Each 
of the six pairwise comparison matrices is described below. 
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B.5.2.1 Internal Control Weaknesses Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
The Internal Control Weaknesses Pairwise Comparison Matrix is a 5x5 matrix 
and represents the Goal Node of the AHP tree.  The rows and columns in the Internal 
Control Weaknesses Pairwise Comparison Matrix are the following: 
• Personnel Weaknesses (PW). 
• Financing/Accounting Reporting Issues (FRI). 
• Policy Issues (PI) 
• Restatements/Adjustments (R/A). 
• Regulatory Issues (RI).  
The pairwise comparison matrix takes the following form: 
 
To Criterion 
  PW FRI PI R/A RI 
From PW 1 A12 A13 A14 A15 
Criterion FRI 1/A12 1 A23 A24 A25 
 PI 1/A13 1/A23 1 A34 A35 
 R/A 1/A14 1/A24 1/A34 1 A45 
 RI 1/A15 1/A25 1/A35 1/A45 1 
 
The pairwise comparisons (A12, A13, . . , A45) denoted in bold in the pairwise comparison 
matrix of this section are filled in by the decision maker. The pairwise comparisons 
denoted in italics are computed by the AHP.  The diagonal elements of this matrix are 1 
because a criterion is being compared to itself. The overall matrix is a reciprocal matrix 
as Aji= 1/Aij for i=1, 2, . . . , 5, j= 2, . . . , 5, i < j. 
B.5.2.2 Personnel Weaknesses Pairwise Comparison Matrix  
Personnel Weaknesses is one of the criterion nodes of the AHP tree. The 
Personnel Weaknesses Pairwise Comparison Matrix is a 5x5 matrix, as there are five sub-
criterion under the Personnel Weaknesses criterion in the AHP tree in Figure B6. The 
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rows and columns in the Personnel Weaknesses Pairwise Comparison Matrix are the 
following: 
• Accounting personnel resources, competency/training (ACT). 
• Ethical compliance issues with personnel (ECI). 
• Senior management competency, tone, reliability issues (SMI) 
• Insufficient or non-existent audit function (INI).  
• Segregations of duties/design of control (personnel) (SD). 
The pairwise comparison matrix takes the following form: 
 
To Criterion 
  ACT ECI SMI INI SD 
From ACT 1 B12 B13 B14 B15 
Criterion ECI 1/B12 1 B23 B24 B25 
 SMI 1/B13 1/B23 1 B34 B35 
 SD 1/B14 1/B24 1/B34 1 B45 
 IAC 1/B15 1/B25 1/B35 1/B45 1 
 
The pairwise comparisons (B12, B13, . . . , B45) denoted in bold in the pairwise comparison 
matrix are filled in by the decision maker.  The pairwise comparisons denoted in italics 
are computed by the AHP.  The diagonal elements of this matrix are 1 because a criterion 
is being compared to itself. The overall matrix is a reciprocal matrix as Aji= 1/Aij for i=1, 
2, . . . , 5, j= 2, . . . , 5 , i < j. 
B.5.2.3 Financing/Accounting Reporting Issues Pairwise Comparison Matrix  
Financing/Accounting Reporting Issues is one of the criterion nodes of the AHP 
tree. The Financing/Accounting Reporting Issues Pairwise Comparison Matrix is a 5x5 
matrix, as there are five sub-criterion under the Financing/Accounting Reporting Issues 
criterion in the AHP tree in Figure B6. The rows and columns in the Financing/ 
Accounting Reporting Issues Pairwise Comparison Matrix are the following: 
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• Treasury control issues (TC). 
• Journal entry control issues (JEC). 
• Non-routine transaction control issues (NTC) 
• Inadequate disclosure controls (ID). 
• Material and/or numerous auditor/YE adjustments (MA).  
The pairwise comparison matrix takes the following form: 
 
To Criterion 
  TC JEC NTC ID MA 
From TC 1 C12 C13 C14 C15 
Criterion JEC 1/C12 1 C23 C24 C25 
 NTC 1/C13 1/C23 1 C34 C35 
 ID 1/C14 1/C24 1/C34 1 C45 
 MA 1/C15 1/C25 1/C35 1/C45 1 
 
The pairwise comparisons (C12, C13, . . . , C45) denoted in bold in the pairwise comparison 
matrix are filled in by the decision maker. The pairwise comparisons denoted in italics 
are computed by the AHP. The diagonal elements of this matrix are 1 because a criterion 
is being compared to itself. The overall matrix is a reciprocal matrix as Aji= 1/Aij for i=1, 
2, . . . , 5, j= 2, . . . , 5, i < j. 
B.5.2.4 Policy Issues Pairwise Comparison Matrix  
Policy Issues is one of the criterion nodes of the AHP tree. The Policy Issues 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix is a 3x3 matrix as there are three sub-criterion under the 
Policy Issues criterion in the AHP tree in Figure B6. The rows and columns in the Policy 
Issues Pairwise Comparison Matrix are the following: 
• Untimely or inadequate account reconciliation (UAR). 
• Accounting documentation, policy and/or procedure (ADP). 
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• Information technology software, security and access issues (IT) 
The pairwise comparison matrix takes the following form: 
 
To Criterion 
  UAR ADP IT 
From UAR 1 D12 D13 
Criterion ADP 1/D12 1 D23 
 IT 1/D13 1/D23 1 
 
The pairwise comparisons (D12, D13, D23) denoted in bold in the pairwise comparison 
matrix are filled in by the decision maker. The pairwise comparisons denoted in italics 
are computed by the AHP.  The diagonal elements of this matrix are 1 because a criterion 
is being compared to itself. The overall matrix is a reciprocal matrix as Aji= 1/Aij for i=1, 
2, 3, j = 2, 3, i < j. 
B.5.2.5 Restatements/Adjustments Pairwise Comparison Matrix  
Restatements/Adjustments is one of the criterion nodes of the AHP tree. The 
Restatements/Adjustments Pairwise Comparison Matrix is a 3x3 matrix as there are three 
sub-criterion under the Restatements/Adjustments criterion in the AHP tree in Figure B6. 
The rows and columns in the Restatements/Adjustments Pairwise Comparison Matrix are 
the following: 
• Restatement or non-reliance of company filings (RNF). 
• Restatement of previous 404 disclosures (RPD). 
• SAB 108 adjustments noted (SAB) 
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To Criterion 
  RNF RPD SAB 
From RNF 1 E12 E13 
Criterion RPD 1/E12 1 E23 
 SAB 1/E13 1/E23 1 
 
The pairwise comparisons (E12, E13, E23) denoted in bold in the pairwise comparison 
matrix are filled in by the decision maker.  The pairwise comparisons denoted in italics 
are computed by the AHP.  The diagonal elements of this matrix are 1 because a criterion 
is being compared to itself. The overall matrix is a reciprocal matrix as Aji= 1/Aij for i = 
1, 2, 3, j = 2, 3, i < j. 
B.5.2.6 Regulatory Issues Pairwise Comparison Matrix  
Regulatory Issues is one of the criterion nodes of the AHP tree. The Regulatory 
Issues Pairwise Comparison Matrix is a 5x5 matrix as there are five sub-criterion under 
the Regulatory Issues criterion in the AHP tree in Figure B6. The rows and columns in 
the Regulatory Issues Pairwise Comparison Matrix are the following: 
• Ineffective or understaffed audit committee (IUA). 
• Ineffective regulatory compliance issues (IRC). 
• Management/Board/Audit Committee investigations (MI) 
• SEC or other regulatory investigations and/or inquiries (SI). 
• Scope/disclaimer of opinion or other limitations (SDL).  
The pairwise comparison matrix takes the following form: 
 
To Criterion 
  IUA IRC MI SI SDL 
From IUA 1 F12 F13 F14 F15 
Criterion IRC 1/F12 1 F23 F24 F25 
 MI 1/F13 1/F23 1 F34 F35 
 SI 1/F14 1/F24 1/F34 1 F45 
 SDLI 1/F15 1/F25 1/F35 1/F45 1 
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The pairwise comparisons (F12, F13, . . . , F45) denoted in bold in the pairwise comparison 
matrix are filled in by the decision maker. The pairwise comparisons denoted in italics 
are computed by the AHP.  The diagonal elements of this matrix are 1 because a criterion 
is being compared to itself. The overall matrix is a reciprocal matrix as Aji= 1/Aij for i = 
1, 2, . . . , 5, j = 2, . . . , 5, i < j. 
B.5.3 Deriving the Pairwise Comparisons for each Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
 After the hierarchy was established, I formulated a questionnaire to be distributed 
to participants of the study. The questionnaire outlines each pairwise comparison that the 
user must complete and provides, as a supplement, the ratio scale table given in Figure 
B3 to remind the user of the scale that should be used to interpretation of the pairwise 
comparisons. An example of a pairwise comparison decision used in the questionnaire is 
presented as Figure B7, page 121. 
A participant presented with the example in Figure B7 would first determine 
which issue is more severe. For example, if the participant thinks that Personnel 
Weaknesses have a greater impact on the financial statements than Financing/Accounting 
Reporting Weaknesses, he/she would select A in the first part of the question shown in 
Figure B7. In the second part of the question, the participant would indicate how much 
greater of an impact Personnel Weaknesses would have on the financial statements, using 
the Pairwise Comparison Scale.  
B.5.4  Experiment Design  
 
The participants of the study are broken down into three different groups: (1) 
auditors, (2) financial analysts, and (3) managers. Although auditors and reporting 
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agencies have touted the importance of internal control to the organization, it is not clear 
that managers and financial analysts value the same aspects of internal control. An 
objective of this analysis is to determine the relative importance the auditors, financial 
analysts and managers place on the twenty-one sub-criteria. Including individuals from 
all three groups will enable the priorities of all stakeholders to be included within the 
final and I will ascertain the different priorities of the members of the three groups.  
Potential participants were randomly selected from a social network. I then 
categorized participants into one of the three different groups. The initial list of potential 
participants included seven auditors, seven financial analysts, and seven managers over 
financial reporting. Each potential participant was then emailed a link to an online 
questionnaire. At the end of the survey period, 18 individuals completed the 
questionnaire. These 18 participants consisted of seven auditors, four financial analysts 
and seven managers over financial reporting. Each participant had at least seven years of 
experience. All seven auditors that completed the survey are at least audit managers 
within one of the Big 4 accounting firms. The seven managers that completed the survey 
all have duties specifically related to the preparation of the financial statements and work 
for publicly traded organizations. The four financial analysts are senior level personnel 
within their respective publicly traded organizations and their duties involve examining 
the financial statements of other organizations to establish recommendations for 
procurement activities.  
Each individual completed the online questionnaire (formulated along the lines of 
Figure B7 above). I used these results to set up the pairwise comparisons of the criteria 
MW categories and the sub-criteria MW categories for each participant. Pairwise 
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comparison matrices for the criteria and sub-criteria were formulated for each individual, 
each group, the participants from the auditor and manager groups, and all participants. 
These individual, group, and combined participant pairwise comparison matrices are then 
used to obtain the weights that are assigned to each MW category.    
Following the calculation of the weights, an internal control score for each firm is 
determined. The score for each firm is determined by the weights for each group and 
group combination. The procedure used for determining these scores follows the 
processes used in the ratings model version of the AHP. I will now describe this process 
in more detail. 
B.5.5  Illustration of Weight Computation  
The weights assigned to each of the criteria and sub-criteria by group are 
determined using the mathematical models underlying the AHP. This is a standard 
analysis and has been described in numerous applications. With the completed pairwise 
comparisons, I use an excel spreadsheet to determine the weights that I assign to each 
criteria and sub-criteria for each participant. The pairwise comparison matrix and the 
calculation of the weights for Auditor 1 is shown in Figure B8, page 122.  
The top third of the Figure B8 displays the pairwise comparison matrix for 
Auditor 1’s criteria category. The pairwise comparisons made by the participant are 
entered into the highlighted area of the table and the reciprocals are then calculated in the 
bottom half of the table. To calculate the weights to be assigned to each criteria and sub-
criteria, three steps are performed. First, I divide each element in the pairwise comparison 
matrix by the sum of all the elements in its column. The results of this first step are 
displayed as the middle section of Figure B8. As a second and final step, the rows 
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displayed as the middle portion of Figure B8 are summed and then divided by the number 
of criteria (in this case 5). The resulting weights are then displayed as the bottom third of 
Figure B8. This figure indicates that Auditor 1 assigns a weight of 0.1519 to the 
Personnel Weakness criterion, etc.  
B.5.6 Analysis of Consistency 
In addition to calculating the weights for each of the criteria and sub-criteria for 
each individual, I check the consistency of the judgments made by each individual. A 
formula developed by Saaty (1980) calculates the consistency of the pairwise comparison 
matrix through the following formula: 







' /C.R.  
 where:  
!max  = Average(A!/!)  
A  = Matrix of pairwise comparisons 
!  = Vector of weights  
C.R.   =  Consistency Ratio, determined by calculating the  
consistency index from a large samples of purely random 
judgments. The values associated with this variable are 
derived from Saaty (1980). For purposes of my analysis, 
C.R. is set equal to 1.12 for the 5x5 matrices and set equal 
to 0.58 for the 3x3 matrices. 
 
  C.I. = Consistency Index 
 
 Saaty (1980) argued that reliable judgments had Consistency Indexes of less than 
0.10. After I had calculated the weights for all the criteria and sub-criteria, I applied the 
above consistency check to each pairwise comparison matrix. The results of this first pass 
suggest that there was a lack of consistency within some of the participant’s judgments. 
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Consistency Indexes for all individuals ranged between 0.00 (completely consistent) to 
0.57 (highly inconsistent) for all matrices. Given the online nature of the AHP 
questionnaire environment, I examined each of the pairwise judgments and emulated the 
results that would have been the product of a group discussion that is generally associated 
with AHP. This additional step ensured consistency within each participant’s pairwise 
comparison matrices (i.e., C.I. was less than 0.10 for all matrices).  
Inconsistencies among some of the judgments could be due to a couple of 
different factors. First, a limited understanding about the AHP environment could be a 
factor that adversely impacted consistency. Had the judgments been made within a 
controlled group environment, this problem would have been eliminated. Second, limited 
AHP training can lead to difficulty in visualizing the relationship between all of the 
judgments. To ensure that the integrity of the weights were maintained, any adjustments 
that were made to the pairwise comparisons were based off of the judgments made with 
respect to the first variable. I compared the weights associated with each matrix before 
and after the judgments were revised and any differences in weights were insignificant, 
irrespective of the changes in consistency.  
B.5.7  Group Analyses and Computational Results 
After the pairwise comparison matrices, their associated weights, and the measure 
of consistency have been established for each individual, I combine the individual results 
by group and establish group pairwise comparison matrices that are used to determine the 
weights assigned to the criteria and sub-criteria for each group. Each element in the 
group’s pairwise comparison matrices is determined based on the geometric average of 
that element for all participants in the group. The geometric average is the n’th root of the 
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product of the each element for each participant. In addition to computing the weights for 
each of the groups, I compute a set of combined groups based two combinations of 
participants (1) all auditor and manager participants and (2) all participants. The results of 
the group computations are shown as Figure B9, page 123. I calculated the consistency 
index for each of the three groups and the combined groups. The consistency indexes 
ranged from 0.001 to 0.01, all well below the required 0.10.17 
B.6  Results 
 In addition to developing an internal control metric that can be used to rank firms 
that have reported MW, this study seeks to gain a greater understanding of the differences 
between the MW perceptions of various financial statement stakeholders. Given the 
breadth of this study, the analysis of the results obtained through AHP is exploratory in 
nature. In the results sections that follow, I provide a high level overview of the AHP 
results and includes a summary of the main results, with respect to how the participants 
feel that different categories and types of MW impact the financial statements.   
B.6.1 Criteria Results 
 The results of the AHP (Figure B9) provide some interesting insights into the 
perceptions of the different groups with respect to how the different types of MW impact 
the financial statements. The criteria weights in Figure B9 indicate the level of impact 
that each of the criteria have on the financial statements compared to the other criteria. 
These criteria weights indicate that managers feel that PW have the greatest impact on the 
financial statements, with 50.1 percent of the weight being attached to this criterion. 
Auditors also feel that PW have the greatest impact (28.9 percent) on the financial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Consistency for the groups prior to the individual pairwise adjustments ranged from 0.01 to 0.03, still 
well below the required 0.10. 
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statements. However, the auditors also feel that FRI and PI have a significant impact on 
the financial statements (23.7 percent and 24.6 percent, respectively). The financial 
analysts feel all criteria groups have approximately the same impact on the financial 
statements with the exception of R/A, which is weighted as having a significantly lower 
financial statement impact (7.6 percent).  
B.6.2 Manager Sub-criteria Results 
 The sub-criteria weights indicate the level of impact that each of the sub-criteria 
(types of MW) have on the financial statements compared to the other sub-criteria. These 
results indicate that the managers find that with respect to the PW category MW, SMI 
and ECI have the greatest impact on the financial statements (36.7 percent and 26.9 
percent, respectively). Managers find that FRI issues are not as clear-cut and three types 
of MW are each considered as having the greatest impact on the financial statements, MA 
(27.9 percent), NTC (24.6 percent), and JEC (22.4 percent). Managers view IT as having 
the greatest financial statement impact (41.4 percent) within the PI criteria category. The 
manager participants indicated that RNF and SAB, within the R/A category, have an 
equally significant impact on the financial statements (39.5 percent and 38.2 percent, 
respectively). Finally, the manager participants indicate that within the RI criteria 
category, SI MW have the greatest impact (31.9 percent) on the financial statements.    
B.6.3 Auditor Sub-criteria Results 
The auditor participants indicate that with respect to the PW category, the SMI 
MW have the greatest impact on the financial statements (36.4 percent). The auditor 
participants clearly indicate that JEC and MA MW have the greatest impact on the 
financial statements (28.4 percent and 25.0 percent, respectively), within the FRI criteria 
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category. Where as manager participants found IT to have the greatest impact on the 
financial statements, auditor participants indicated that within the PI category, ADP MW 
have the greatest impact on the financial statements (45.4 percent). The auditor 
participants indicated that RNF MW have a significantly greater impact (58.3 percent) on 
the financial statements than the other types of MW in the R/A category. Finally, the 
auditor participants conclude that within the RI criteria category, SDL, MI, and SI MW 
have the greatest impact (27.9 percent, 27.4 percent, and 24.5 percent, respectively) on 
the financial statements. 
B.6.4 Financial Analyst Sub-criteria Results  
The financial analyst participants rate the MW (sub-criteria) within the PW and 
FRI criteria categories as having a fairly equal impact on the financial statements, there 
are no types of MW that tend to rise above the rest within these categories. However, 
ADP MW within the PI criteria category are clearly viewed by this group as having a 
greater impact on the financial statements (55.6 percent) than the other types of MW 
within this category. The SAB and RNF MW sub-criteria categories are both viewed as 
having a significant impact on the financial statements (42.3 percent and 38.7 percent, 
respectively) within the financial analyst’s R/A category. Finally, financial analyst 
participants indicate that SI MW have the greatest impact on the financial statements 
within the RI category. 
B.7 The Ratings Model – Applying the Weights to the Audit Analytics Data 
The final weights that are applied to each sub-criteria are determined by 
multiplying the weights the criteria and their associated sub-criteria together. For 
example, the weight that would be applied to sub-criteria ACT, for the manager group, is 
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calculated as the weight of PW (0.510) multiplied by the weight of ACT (0.165). The 
weight that results from this multiplication is 0.084 and this is the weight that will be 
applied to the ACT MW that are reported by each company. 
The Audit Analytics database defines the specific types of MW reported by each 
firm that has to comply with SOX. I use an indicator variable for each specific type of 
MW that is reported by each firm. This indicator variable is set equal to one if the 
company reported an internal control failure for this subcategory in the AHP tree and 
zero otherwise. The specific types of MW are listed as the sub-criteria in Figure B9.  
An internal control metric for each group and combination of participants is 
calculated using the weights identified above multiplied by the MW type indicator 
variables for each firm that reports MW. For example, I would calculate the manager 
group internal control metric (ICI_MAN) for a firm that reports Senior management 
competency, tone, reliability issues (SMI) and Accounting documentation, policy and/or 
procedure issues (ADP) as follows: 
ICI_MAN = SMI(0.187) + ADP(0.037) = 0.224  
This metric indicates the severity of a firm’s internal control issues. A higher 
score is indicative of more severe internal control issues. I calculate internal control 
metrics for all firms that report MW based on the manager group weights (ICI_MAN), the 
auditor group weights (ICI_AUD), the financial analyst group weights (ICI_AN), all 
auditor and manager participants (ICI_A&M), and all participants (ICI_ALL).  
B.8 AHP Application 
 To test the robustness of the metric that is obtained through the above process, I 
use the results of the AHP analysis and examine whether these results are related to firm 
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performance as proxied by cumulative annual stock market returns. Auditors and 
academics alike have touted increased returns are among of the benefits associated with 
strong internal control systems (Hammersley et al 2008; Kim and Park 2009; Gordon and 
Wilford 2012). As such, I examine whether there is a link between the AHP internal 
control strength classification and stock market returns in Appendix C, below.  
B.9  Conclusion 
 Through the above analysis I shed light on two issues that have previously been 
unexplored. The first issue is the unavailability of an index of internal control strength. 
The results that are obtained through the above procedures employ the perceptions of 
stakeholder groups to develop a metric of internal control strength. This metric can then 
be used to examine empirical issues where the strength of internal control may lead to 
further additional insights. One such issue, examined within Appendix C, is whether a 
relation exists between the internal control metric and stock market returns.  
 In addition to developing a metric, this AHP analysis distinguishes between the 
perceptions of auditors, financial analysts and managers. Auditors and managers play a 
clear role in determining the severity of MW. Further, the results of the recent study by 
Bedard and Graham (2011) indicate that differences exist between manager and auditor 
assessments of MW severity. These differences may be due to varying opinions of the 
various stakeholders regarding the specific types of MW. The insights from this AHP 
analysis provide valuable information that provides an insight into the different values 
that stakeholders place on the different types of MW.  
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Figure B1 – General Direct Comparison AHP Model Example 
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SCA SCB SCC SCD Score 
Alternative 1           
Alternative 2           
 
Figure B2a presents a graphical illustration of the Ratings AHP Model. Figure B2b presents a spreadsheet 
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Figure B3 – Pairwise Comparison Scale+ 
 
Value Definition Explanation 
1 Equally Preferred The two criteria are equally preferred 
3 Moderately Preferred Experience and judgment classify one 
criterion as slightly more preferred than 
the other  
5 Strongly Preferred Experience and judgment classify one 
criterion as strongly more preferred 
than the other 
7 Very Strongly Preferred The evidence shows that one criterion 
is very strongly more preferred than the 
other 
9 Extremely Strongly Preferred The evidence that shows one criterion 
is more preferred than another and is of 
the highest possible order of 
affirmation 
Values of 2, 4, 6, and 8 can be used for intermediate values. Values of 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, etc. can be 
used for categories that are very close in importance. 
 
 
This table is a pairwise comparison scale that is used to determine the differences between two criteria. 
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Figure B4a: Direct Comparison AHP Model – Synthesize Results 
 
Figure B4b - Results 
Eval: Alt1= (0.3)(0.66)(0.6)+(0.3)(0.34)(0.2)+(0.7)(0.23)(0.72)+(0.7)(0.77)(0.5)=0.525 
Eval: Alt2=(0.3)(0.66)(0.4)+(0.3)(0.34)(0.8)+(0.7)(0.23)(0.28)+(0.7)(0.77)(0.5)=0.475 
 
Figure B4a presents a graphical representation of how to apply the weights to the criteria, sub-criteria and 
alternatives within the Direct Comparison AHP Model. Figure B4b illustrates how to evaluate each 
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SCA SCB SCC SCD Score 
Alternative 1 1 0 1 1  0.898 
Alternative 2  1 1 0 1  0.839 
 
 
Alternative 1 = (0.30*0.66*1)+(0.30*0.34*0)+(0.70*0.23*1)+(0.70*0.77*1) = .898 
 
Alternative 2= (0.30*0.66*1)+(0.30*0.34*1)+(0.70*0.23*0)+(0.70*0.77*1) = .839 
 
The graphic in Figure B5 presents a representation of how to apply the weights to the criteria and sub-
criteria. As a second step, these weights are then applied to the Alternatives based upon whether the 
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Figure B6 – Internal Control Weakness AHP Tree 
 
 
Internal Control Weaknesses 
Personnel Weaknesses 
(PW) 
Accounting personnel resources, competency/training 
(ACT) 
Ethical compliance issues with personnel (ECI) 
Senior management competency, tone, reliability issues 
(SMI) 
Insufficient or non-existent internal audit function (INI) 
Segregations of duties/design of control (personnel) (SD) 
Financing/Accounting 
Reporting Issues (FRI) 
Treasury control issues (TC) 
Journal entry control issues (JEC) 
Non-routine transaction control issues (NTC) 
Inadequate disclosure controls (ID) 
Material and/or numerous auditor/YE adjustments (MA) 
Policy Issues (PI) 
Untimely or inadequate account reconciliations (UAR) 
Accounting documentation, policy and/or procedure (ADP) 




Restatement or nonreliance of company filings (RNF) 
Restatement of previous 404 disclosures (RPD) 
SAB 108 adjustments noted (SAB) 
Regulatory Issues (RI) 
Ineffective or understaffed audit committee (IUA) 
Ineffective regulatory compliance issues (IRC) 
Management/Board/Audit Committee investigations (MI) 
SEC or other regulatory investigations and/or inquiries (SI) 
Scope/disclaimer of opinion or other limitations (SDL) 
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Figure B8 – Auditor 1 Comparison Matrix 
Auditor 1           
  PW FRI PI R/A RI 
PW 1.0000 0.3333 0.2000 3.0000 3.0000 
FRI 3.0000 1.0000 0.7000 3.0000 5.0000 
PI 5.0000 1.4286 1.0000 3.0000 5.0000 
R/A 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 1.0000 1.0000 
RI 0.3333 0.2000 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000 
 Sum 9.6667 3.2952 2.4333 11.0000 15.0000 
  
    
  
  PW FRI PI R/A RI 
PW 0.1034 0.1012 0.0822 0.2727 0.2000 
FRI 0.3103 0.3035 0.2877 0.2727 0.3333 
PI 0.5172 0.4335 0.4110 0.2727 0.3333 
R/A 0.0345 0.1012 0.1370 0.0909 0.0667 
RI 0.0345 0.0607 0.0822 0.0909 0.0667 
            
PW 0.15190 













   
  
RI 0.06699      
 
 
The top third of the Figure B8 displays the pairwise comparison matrix for Auditor 1’s criteria category. 
The pairwise comparisons made by the participant are entered into the top half (highlighted area) of the 
table and the reciprocals are then calculated in the bottom half of the table. To calculate the weights to be 
assigned to each criteria and sub-criteria, three steps are performed: (1) divide each element in the pairwise 
comparison matrix by the sum of all the elements in its column (these results are displayed as the middle 
section of Figure B8) (2) the rows displayed as the middle portion of Figure B8 are summed and then 
divided by the number of criteria (in this case 5) (3) the resulting weights are displayed as the bottom third 
of Figure B8. This figure indicates that Auditor 1 assigns a weight of 0.1519 to the Personnel Weakness 
criterion (PW), etc. Consistency is a measure of the consistency of the individual’s judgments. The 
definition of its calculation is explained on page 110. 
 
PW=Personnel Weaknesses; FRI=Financing/Accounting Reporting Issues; PI=Policy Issues; 
R/A=Restatements/Adjustments; RI=Regulatory Issues
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Figure B9 – AHP Weights by Group 
 
Figure B9 displays the weights from the criteria and sub-criteria pairwise comparison matrices of each of the groups. The group weights are calculated through 
the geometric average. Additionally, the final weight for each MW type (sub-criteria) is calculated by multiplying the criteria weights by the sub-criteria weights 





PW FRI PI R/A RI 
0.510 0.113 0.122 0.108 0.147 
Sub-criteria 
ACT ECI SMI INI SD TC JEC NTC ID MA UAR ADP IT RNF RPD SAB IUA IRC MI SI SDL 
0.165 0.269 0.367 0.064 0.134 0.147 0.224 0.246 0.104 0.279 0.281 0.305 0.414 0.395 0.222 0.382 0.164 0.172 0.119 0.319 0.225 




PW FRI PI R/A RI 
0.289 0.237 0.246 0.090 0.137 
Sub-criteria 
ACT ECI SMI INI SD TC JEC NTC ID MA UAR ADP IT RNF RPD SAB IUA IRC MI SI SDL 
0.106 0.207 0.364 0.100 0.223 0.182 0.284 0.181 0.103 0.250 0.295 0.454 0.251 0.583 0.188 0.229 0.123 0.080 0.274 0.245 0.279 





PW FRI PI R/A RI 
0.203 0.258 0.249 0.076 0.214 
Sub-criteria 
ACT ECI SMI INI SD TC JEC NTC ID MA UAR ADP IT RNF RPD SAB IUA IRC MI SI SDL 
0.172 0.249 0.244 0.193 0.143 0.172 0.253 0.179 0.228 0.168 0.278 0.556 0.166 0.387 0.190 0.423 0.198 0.147 0.226 0.302 0.127 






PW FRI PI R/A RI 
0.399 0.171 0.180 0.103 0.148 
Sub-criteria 
ACT ECI SMI INI SD TC JEC NTC ID MA UAR ADP IT RNF RPD SAB IUA IRC MI SI SDL 
0.134 0.239 0.371 0.081 0.175 0.164 0.254 0.212 0.104 0.266 0.293 0.379 0.328 0.490 0.208 0.302 0.146 0.121 0.187 0.289 0.259 




PW FRI PI R/A RI 
0.350 0.190 0.198 0.098 0.164 
Sub-criteria 
ACT ECI SMI INI SD TC JEC NTC ID MA UAR ADP IT RNF RPD SAB IUA IRC MI SI SDL 
0.148 0.232 0.325 0.110 0.183 0.168 0.256 0.207 0.125 0.243 0.294 0.419 0.286 0.467 0.205 0.327 0.157 0.127 0.197 0.295 0.223 
Weight 0.052 0.081 0.114 0.039 0.064 0.032 0.049 0.039 0.024 0.046 0.058 0.083 0.057 0.046 0.020 0.032 0.026 0.021 0.032 0.048 0.037 
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Figure B9 Cont. 
 
The definitions for the criteria and sub-criteria are as follows: PW=Personnel Weaknesses; FRI=Financing/Accounting Reporting Issues; PI=Policy Issues; 
R/A=Restatements/Adjustments; RI=Regulatory Issues; ACT=Accounting personnel resources, competency/training; ECI=Ethical compliance issues with 
personnel; SMI=Senior management competency, tone, reliability issues; INI=Insufficient or non-existent internal audit function; SD=Segregations of 
duties/design of control (personnel); TC=Treasury control issues; JEC=Journal entry control issues; NTC=Non-routine transaction control issues; ID=Inadequate 
disclosure controls; MA=Material and/or numerous auditor/YE adjustments; UAR=Untimely or inadequate account reconciliations; ADP=Accounting 
documentation, policy and/or procedure; IT=Information technology, software, security and access issues; RNF=Restatement or nonreliance of company filings; 
RPD=Restatement of previous 404 disclosures; SAB=SAB 108 adjustments noted; IUA=Ineffective or understaffed audit committee; IRC=Ineffective regulatory 
compliance issues; MI=Management/Board/Audit Committee investigations; SI=SEC or other regulatory investigations and/or inquiries; SDL=Scope/disclaimer 
of opinion or other limitations 
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Appendix C: AHP Internal Control Metric and Firm Performance 
 
C.1  Introduction 
 Appendix B introduces a metric for internal control strength that is developed 
through AHP. Prior literature recognizes that the category (account-specific versus entity-
level) of reported MW and even specific MW have differing effects on accrual quality 
(Doyle et al. 2007b) and management forecast accuracy (Feng et al. 2009; Li et al. 2011). 
This appendix discusses a preliminary study that examines the robustness of the internal 
control index, developed above, by testing whether a relation exists between 
performance, proxied by compounded market-adjusted annual stock market returns, and 
internal control quality, proxied by the AHP Internal Control Metric developed in 
Appendix B. 
C.2 Hypotheses 
Current research indicates that internal control negatively impacts firm 
performance (Hammersley et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Gordon and Wilford 
2012).  Additionally, research also indicates that there are differences in firm factor 
reactions to the various types of MW that are reported (Feng et al. 2009; Li et al. 2012). 
The results from the AHP study above indicate that financial statement stakeholders 
perceive that the different types of MW have differing impacts on the financial 
statements. Given the research that suggests MW negatively impact performance and the 
different types of MW have different impacts on the financial statements, I develop the 
following hypothesis to test the robustness of the internal control index.  
H1:  A higher internal control index value will negatively impact 
performance. 
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C.3 Empirical Study Development 
  
C.3.1 Methodology 
 To test the hypothesis defined in the previous section (H1), I use the following 
OLS regression model to examine the impact of MW in the current year on firm 
investment efficiency in the following year.  
     (1) 
 When applying the above model, I cluster at the firm level and include industry 
and year fixed effects. Since I use panel data, I account for industry fixed-effects using 
the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification. The combination of clustering at 
the firm level and accounting for industry and year fixed effects adjusts standard errors 
for heteroskedasticity, serial-, and cross-sectional correlation (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 
2010).  
C.3.2 Dependent Variable 
 The disclosure of MW results in a decrease in stock market returns (Hammersley 
et al. 2008; Kim and Park 2009). I calculate performance as the compounded annual 
market-adjusted stock return for each firm (CMAR) using data from CRSP. Stock returns 
are adjusted using the value-weighted market index returns. 
C.3.3 Independent Variables 
 As stated above, I expect a negative relationship to exist between internal control 
quality (as defined by the internal control index developed above) and stock market 
returns. Accordingly, the key independent variable in the current study is the internal 
control index (ICI_MAN, ICI_AUD, ICI_AN, ICI_AM, and ICI_ALL). ICI_MAN 
represents the internal control index calculated from the manager participant base, 
CMARi,t = !0 +!1 * ICIi,t +!2 *MKT _CAPi,t +!3 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!4 *FCRi,t
+!5 *LOSSi,t +!6 *SL _GRi,t +"i,t
!
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ICI_AUD represents the internal control index calculated from the auditor participant 
base, ICI_AN represents the internal control index calculated from the financial analyst 
participant base, ICI_AM represents the internal control index calculated from the auditor 
and manager participant base, and ICI_ALL represents the internal control index 
calculated from all participants.  
Five control variables are used within the analysis and mirror the variables used by 
Gordon and Wilford (2012). These control variables are additional independent variables 
in my model and were selected based on the extant literature. The first control variable is 
based on the size of the firm I measure this variable as the logarithm of each firm’s 
market capitalization (MKT_CAP). I use firm age as the second control variable. This 
variable is measured as the logarithm of the number of years the firm has existed within 
the CRSP database (AGE_FIRM). I account for a firm’s financial stability is the third 
control variable and measure this variable (LOSS) as the sum of earnings before 
extraordinary items for the past two years (Doyle et al. 2007).  If the sum is less than 
zero, the firm is assigned an indicator variable of one, zero otherwise. As a fourth control 
variable I measure firm complexity as an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm 
reported a foreign currency translation adjustment (FCR) and zero otherwise. Finally, he 
fifth control variable, firm fluctuation, is calculated as year over year sales growth for 
years t-2 through t (where t is the current year) and each observation is decile ranked 
dependent on its respective average sales growth over the previous three years 
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C.3.4 Sample Selection 
 The firms and observations included in this study are drawn from the Audit 
Analytics database. I draw my initial sample from all firms that report MW within their 
management internal control reports (8,528) in accordance with SOX Section 404 during 
the time period of November 2004 (the effective date for reporting under Section 404) 
through May 2011 (fiscal year 2010). Table 1 summarizes the composition of the final 
sample of observations used in the current study.  
 Two screens are applied to the initial sample to arrive at the final sample used in 
the current study. First, duplicate observations are eliminated (153 observations) to 
ensure that each firm had at most only one observation included for any given year (i.e., 
in cases of restatements the last filing is retained). Within the second and final screen, all 
observations that do not have the CRSP/Compustat data available to calculate the 
variables used within the current study and discussed above are eliminated. Following 
these categories of eliminations the analyses in the current study are performed using a 
total of 2,040 observations (Table C.1).18  
C.3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Table C.2 presents univariate statistics for the 2,040 observations that are used in 
the current study. The compounded market-adjusted stock market returns for the sample 
have a mean of -0.099. Since this sample is comprised of only firms that report MW, this 
negative result is not concerning. The internal control indices range from a low of 0.027 
to a high of 0.881. All of the internal control indices have similar standard deviations. 
The financial analyst index (ICI_AN) has the lowest values with a low point of 0.027 and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 The significant decline in the number of observations is due mostly to the inclusion of non-accelerated 
filers in the initial sample. These firms are smaller, and CRSP/Compustat data is not available for the 
majority of firms that fall into this category. 
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a high point of 0.782. The descriptive statistics associated with the other five control 
characteristics are consistent with those found described in the capital investments study 
above and prior research (Gordon and Wilford 2012).  
C.4 Empirical Results 
 
Table C.3 presents the OLS regression results for the test of H1 using equation 
(1).19 Equation 1 is estimated separately for each internal control index (ICI_MAN, 
ICI_AUD, ICI_AN, ICI_AM, and ICI_ALL). ICI_MAN, ICI_AUD, ICI_AN, ICI_AM, and 
ICI_ALL are used as the key independent control variables in columns (1), (2), (3), (4), 
and (5), respectively. The regression models have adjusted R2s ranging from 15.5 percent 
to 15.8 percent, with higher explanatory power being attributed to the ICI_MAN index.  
Over all five specifications of the internal control index using equation (1) and a 
pooled regression analysis, I reach the same conclusion, the severity if internal control 
issues, as proxied by the internal control index, has a negative and significant relation 
with firm performance, proxied by stock market returns. More specifically, I find that the 
two estimated internal control index coefficients are all negative and significant at the 
0.01 level. These results are robust to the inclusion of both firm-level characteristics and 
industry fixed effects. The results associated with the control variables are consistent with 
expectations and prior research. The results in Table C.3 suggest that as the severity of 
internal control issues increases, firm performance decreases.  
C.5 Concluding Comments 
 This simple study provides a first look at the relation between internal control 
quality, as proxied by an internal control index, and firm performance. Although the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 We test the Variance Inflation Factors for all variables in each regression and find that the maximum 
factor is less than 5 for each variable. This test alleviates any concerns related to multicollinearity. 
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results suggest that the AHP developed internal control index is significantly related to 
firm performance, the results are limited and this relation should be examined further.  
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Table C.1 
Internal Control Index Study: Sample Selection 
 
Sample Selection   
  MW Sample (Observations with MW) 
 Total number of Section 404 reports with MW for fiscal years 2004-2010  8,528  
Eliminate duplicates due to financial restatements  (153) 
Eliminate firm years due to data restrictions imposed by the current study  (6,335) 
Total number of observations identified for use in the current study  2,040  
 
Table C.1 defines the steps employed to arrive at the final MW and control samples for firms that report on 
their internal control during fiscal years 2004 through 2010. 
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Table C.2 
Internal Control Index Study: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CMAR  2,040  -0.099 0.504 -0.892 2.078 
ICI_MAN  2,040  0.182 0.115 0.032 0.857 
ICI_AUD  2,040  0.254 0.107 0.031 0.881 
ICI_AN  2,040  0.254 0.091 0.027 0.782 
ICI_AM  2,040  0.212 0.108 0.038 0.862 
ICI_ALL  2,040  0.223 0.104 0.037 0.845 
MKT_CAP  2,040  2,010.55 15,531.77 0.969 386,402.10 
AGE_FIRM  2,040  13.366 12.992 0.000 85.000 
FCR  2,040  0.311 0.463 0.000 1.000 
LOSS  2,040  0.451 0.498 0.000 1.000 
SL_GR  2,040  5.853 2.995 1.000 10.000 
 
This table displays the descriptive statistics. The observations are drawn from the time period of November 
2004 through May 2011. All variables are defined within the study. 
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Table C.3 
Relation between the Internal Control Index and Stock Market Returns 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -0.89*** -0.87*** -0.86*** -0.88*** -0.88*** 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
ICI_AUD -0.35*** 
    
 
(0.10) 
    ICI_MAN 
 
-0.38*** 
   
  
(0.08) 




   
(0.12) 
  ICI_A&M 
   
-0.39*** 
 
    
(0.09) 
 ICI_ALL 
    
-0.38*** 
     
(0.10) 
MKT_CAP 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
AGE_FIRM 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
FCR 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LOSS -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
SL_GR -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
      Industry FE Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,040 2,040 2,040 2,040 2,040 
R-squared 15.80% 15.60% 15.50% 15.70% 15.70% 
 
Table 3 reports results for the following OLS regression: 
 
          (1) 
 
Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All variables are defined within the study. 
  
CMARi,t = !0 +!1 * ICIi,t +!2 *MKT _CAPi,t +!3 *AGE _FIRMi,t +!4 *FCRi,t
+!5 *LOSSi,t +!6 *SL _GRi,t +"i,t
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